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INTERNATIONAL SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS
INTRODUCTION
4
In late 2003, human rights organizations brought a case against the British government’s arms sales (including small
arms sales) to Indonesia. They argued that these exports violated the UK export criteria, as there was a ‘patent’ risk
that the weapons would be used for internal repression (Norton-Taylor and Agionby, 2003). This incident illustrates
that much controversy still surrounds the issue of arms sales to countries where serious human rights violations take
place, something that this chapter also shows. 
Previous editions of the Small Arms Survey tried to identify main exporters and importers of small arms,1 to examine
the level of transparency in the small arms trade,2 and to explore the links between legal and illicit arms transfers. This
chapter continues to follow developments in the small arms and light weapons trade and state transparency. However,
it does so in a slightly different way than in previous years. For the first time, it contains extensive listings of both
main importers and exporters, with their most important trading partners and principal categories of weapons traded.
The section on main exporters also systematically compares data from different sources (customs data and national reports
on exports of military goods). The comparison shows that we are still far from a clear and coherent picture of the
authorized trade in small arms. This is an important reason for introducing a second novelty: the Small Arms Trade
Transparency Barometer. The barometer assesses the transparency of the main exporting states on a 20-point scale.
It will be a recurrent feature of the Small Arms Survey. In subsequent editions, it should thus be possible to assess to
what extent individual states are becoming more or less transparent over time, and hence whether we are moving
towards a clearer picture of the authorized trade. As noted in previous editions of the Small Arms Survey, a good
understanding of the legal (or authorized) trade is crucial for understanding the illicit market.
It is with a view to better comprehend the authorized trade that the chapter also sets out to examine the rela-
tionship between production and trade for the first time. The goal is to assess to what extent the small arms industry
is dependent on trade for survival. Future editions of the Survey will deal with the other main source of small arms
transfers, namely pre-existing state stockpiles.3
Lastly, in line with the theme of the 2004 edition of the Small Arms Survey, the chapter also examines the links
between human rights violations and small arms transfers. Here, the goal is to detail small arms transfers to states
where serious violations of human rights take place. In fact, there are surprisingly many such transfers.
The chapter seeks to answer the following questions:
• What are the recent trends in the authorized international small arms trade?
• Who are the leading international exporters and importers of small arms?
• How transparent is the authorized trade in SALW?
• How export-dependent are small arms producers?
• What are the links between the small arms trade and human rights violations?
chapter 4-04  5.7.2004  9:48  Page 99
100
SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004
A number of issues pertaining to transfers will remain unexplored. Some of these are discussed elsewhere in this
volume, such as questions related to the illicit trade in small arms (BROKERING), and the trade in MANPADS (MANPADS).
The main findings of the chapter include the following:
• The largest small arms exporters by value, according to the latest available data as well as estimates, are the
US, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China.
• The largest known small arms importers by value are the US, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, South Korea,
Germany, and Canada.
• According to the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, the most transparent states among the larger
exporters of small arms and light weapons are the United States, Germany, and France. However, even they
are not fully transparent.
• Despite the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) moratorium on small arms, states in the
region import significant amounts of firearms from Western and other sources.
• Small arms manufacturers of large producer countries, such as Brazil, Germany, and (to a lesser extent) Russia, are
dependent on exports for their survival. US manufacturers, in contrast, produce mainly for domestic consumption.
• European exporters of civilian small arms are heavily dependent on the US market.
• The ability of states classed as having serious human rights problems to import arms is quite uneven. At one
extreme, Russia—although involved in a war marred by human rights violations in Chechnya—has unlimited
access to small arms of all types and from almost all states; at the other, no transfer of small arms was recorded
to Iraq while it was embargoed under Saddam Hussein.
THE AUTHORIZED GLOBAL SMALL ARMS TRADE: ANNUAL UPDATE
This section provides an update and new information on the authorized global small arms trade. It focuses on the largest
exporters and importers globally, their trading partners, and main products traded. It includes information on parts,
whenever available, as well as on small arms ammunition, but does not cover grenades and mines. Moreover, it
should be noted that, given gaps in the current data on light weapons ammunition, trade in ammunition is almost
certainly underestimated (see Box 4.1 for details of an effort to circumvent this problem). The same is true of the trade
in military small arms and light weapons, due to limited transparency on the part of many states.
The value of exports of small arms for 2001 documented in international customs data is approximately USD 2.4
billion.4 This is slightly more than for 2000, when documented exports amounted to USD 2.1 billion (Small Arms
Survey, 2003, p. 97), at least partly because, in a departure from previous practice, small arms parts are included in
the calculations. There are therefore no reasons to modify the estimated total value of the authorized trade in small
arms, namely USD 4 billion a year. The largest exporters by value in 2001 were the United States, Italy, Belgium,
Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China. The largest importers in 2001 were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan,
South Korea, Germany, and Canada.
As always, the data presented in tabular form in this section should be interpreted with caution. Information (cus-
toms data and national export reports) is available from the most transparent states; the exports and imports of less
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transparent states are most likely underestimated. Our attempts to circumvent this problem with estimation techniques
for states thought to be important in the global trade clearly cannot solve the problem of a lack of transparency.
Small arms exports
Of several sources of information on small arms exports, the two most important are national reports on exports of
military goods and international customs data (as reported to UN Comtrade).5 Here, we have attempted to systemat-
ically compare data from these two sources; where available, both sets are presented in Table 4.1. The comparison reveals
that international customs data and export reports usually diverge significantly. Some of the possible reasons for this
have been detailed in the ‘remarks’ column of Table 4.1. The most important reasons are: unequal reporting (a state might
publish a rather detailed export report, but not report all its customs statistics internationally); different definitions of
small arms and light weapons in the two sources; and the fact that some transfers do not go through customs (direct
state-to-state transfers) and hence appear only in national export reports. Other possible reasons are that transfers to
peacekeeping operations abroad sometimes go through customs but would not appear in export reports, and cus-
toms data at times includes guns returned to producers for repairs and refitting or servicing. The comparison suggests
an urgent need for international standardization of national export reports. It is paradoxical that national export
reports, which are published mainly for reasons of transparency, are at times less transparent on the small arms trade
than international customs data, which were not designed as an arms trade transparency device.
The comparison also shows that, unless all states report their authorized imports and exports through customs
and publish export reports, only a partial understanding of the trade can be obtained. Romania illustrates this point.
Romania published a first export report in 2002 (see Box 4.3 and Table 4.5), in which it lists its main trading partners
for arms generally: US, Israel, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. Small arms (including small arms ammunition) form a large
part of total Romanian arms exports (about 63 per cent of the total or USD 15.4 million in 2001). As Romania has not
provided its customs data for 2001 to international customs databases, we rely on importers’ customs reports on their
small arms trade with Romania (a total of USD 4.2 million only). While the US still is the largest customer, Switzerland
comes second, followed by Senegal, Italy, and the Czech Republic. It is quite possible that an accurate list would
include Israel, India, Pakistan, or Turkey, but among these countries only Turkey provides detailed import data to
international customs databases. Hence, if we have to rely on importers’ reports of their small arms trade with
Romania, we are left with only a partial understanding of Romanian trade, in which the role of transparent states,
such as Switzerland, Senegal, Italy, and the Czech Republic, probably is overstated. 
To begin circumventing problems such as these, our data on exports, for the first time, makes use of estimates
for China, a major producer of small arms (PRODUCERS), which provides very limited information on its exports.6
The estimation technique is simple, and is based on other states’ ratios of small arms exports to total arms exports.
Details on the estimation technique are given in Annex 4.I, available on the Small Arms Survey Web site.7
To make full use of international customs data, we have used both exporters’ reports on their exports, and so-called
mirror data, i.e. importer’s declarations on the same transactions (the two should in principle be identical). As is evident
in Table 4.1, mirror data is particularly important for determining exports of non-reporting countries.
Our analysis shows that, globally, the US, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China were the top exporters
of small arms and light weapons in terms of value in 2001. Other important exporters were Austria, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Japan (non-military small arms only), and Spain. Countries that are known to be medium producers of small
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arms (Small Arms Survey 2003, Table 3.1), but about whose exports very little is known, include Iran, Pakistan, and
Singapore. Some countries, such as Pakistan, are making strong efforts to increase their arms exports, including of
small arms, although it is unclear whether they have been successful to date (Siddiqa-Agha, 2002).
Some points emerging from the table are worthy of particular mention. Saudi Arabia is a very large recipient of small
arms from countries such as Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, France, Spain, the UK, and the US. In 2003, there were news reports
of leakages of small arms from Saudi stocks to terrorist organizations, in particular al Qaeda (STOCKPILES). Given the closed
nature of the Saudi regime, it is possible to assume that such reports might constitute only the tip of an iceberg.
Exports from the Czech Republic to Yemen have been substantial for several years, and have been criticized for
almost as long. Yemen is a particularly sensitive destination given its role as a regional hub in small arms trafficking.
In a recent UN Security Council report on violations of the arms embargo against Somalia (a country experiencing a
protracted civil war), Yemen is labelled ‘Somalia’s arms supermarket’ (UNSC, 2003b, p. 19). Yemen is also allegedly
a source of weapons for terrorists operating in Saudi Arabia. According to Saudi authorities, the weapons and explo-
sives used in the 12 May 2003 bombings of housing compounds in Riyadh, which killed 35 people, were smuggled
in from Yemen (Al Jazeerah, 2003). Since then, border control between the two countries has been substantially
reinforced.
Another point worthy of mention is Brazilian and Russian exports of small arms to Algeria (see Table 4.13 for further
exports, including by other countries, to Algeria over the past years), whose human rights situation is one of the worst
in the world, and where both government-controlled and Islamist forces are accused of grave violations. Moreover,
small arms are often directly involved in these human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2003b).
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A Canadian crew in Pakistan loads a consignment of machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades with ammunition into a plane destined 
for Afghanistan in February 2003.
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As noted above regarding medium producers such as Iran, Pakistan, and Singapore, some countries are noteworthy
for the lack of information on exports. Examples of less important producers include Serbia and Montenegro and
Moldova/Transdniestria. Serbia is home to the well-known Zastava Arms Company. Even considering that the industry
is in crisis, Serbian officially declared exports are conspicuously small. At the same time, reports of Serbian firearms
ending up in war zones have started to emerge: a Belgrade arms broker recently diverted Serbian-made assault rifles
(manufactured in 2001 and 2002) to Liberia. The Serbian authorities withdrew the broker’s licence when confronted
with the evidence gathered by UN experts investigating violations of the arms embargo against Liberia (UNSC, 2003a;
Vines, 2003). Moldova, in particular the breakaway Transdniestria area, is a ‘black hole’, with large known arsenals and
very little transparency. In a recent report, Associated Press claimed to have obtained a copy of a confidential 1998
agreement, in which ‘Russia and Trans-Dniester would share profits from the sale of 40,000 tons of “unnecessary” arms
and ammunition stored in an arms depot in the breakaway region’. Until December 2003, the depot also contained
hundreds of portable surface-to-air missiles, which Russia now claims have been withdrawn because of concerns that
they could end up in terrorists’ hands (Jahn, 2004; for similar stories relating to both surplus stocks of arms and pro-
duction, see BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2003). The same could in principle be true for other smaller producers with
few known exports, even though fewer reports exist on dubious weapons exports from these countries.
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Table 4.1 Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 
(most recent complete yearly data available)
Country USD value customs Main known recipients Main known types  Remarks
data (Comtrade)*/ (listed in order of of SALW exported
Export reportX (2001 if importance) 
not otherwise stated)
Australia 11.3m* UK, US, Japan, New Ammunition, pistols/ Publishes an export report, but does not 
Zealand, Thailand* revolvers, shotguns, detail the SALW share of arms exports. 
sporting/hunting rifles*
Austria At least 77.7m* US, Germany, Sweden, Pistols/revolvers, Reports its trade neither in military   
Venezuela, Canada* ammunition, parts weapons nor in pistols and revolvers to  
pistols/revolvers, Comtrade. Hence the value for these 
sporting/hunting rifles, categories (based on importersÕ reports) 
parts sporting/hunting is likely to be underestimated.  
weapons*
Belgium 234.0m* Saudi Arabia, US, France, Military weapons, The discrepancy between customs and 
EUR 82.0m (USD 73.5m)X Portugal, UK* shotguns, parts export report data is difficult to explain. 
sporting/hunting weapons, It could be partly because the customs  
ammunition, sporting/ data includes repairs and refurbishing.
hunting rifles* Export report does not detail recipients 
of small arms.
Brazil At least 99.1m* US, Germany, Saudi Sporting/hunting rifles, Does not report trade in military weapons,  
Arabia, Colombia, pistols/revolvers, pistols, parts of revolvers and pistols, parts
Algeria* ammunition, shotguns* of military weapons, or small arms 
ammunition to Comtrade. Hence the 
value is likely to be underestimated.8
Bulgaria At least 17.1m* Saudi Arabia, Macedonia, Ammunition, parts Does not report on its SALW trade at all to   
US, Austria, Italy* sporting/hunting Comtrade. Figures are based on importersÕ
weapons, military reports. Hence the value is likely to be   
weapons, shotguns* underestimated.
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Table 4.1 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 
(most recent complete yearly data available)
Country USD value customs Main known recipients Main known types  Remarks
data (Comtrade)*/ (listed in order of of SALW exported
Export report (2001 if importance) 
not otherwise stated)
Canada 53.6m* US, Denmark, Netherlands, Military weapons, International customs data and the 
CAD 25.8m (USD 16.7m)X UK, France* ammunition, sporting/ national report diverge largely because  
hunting rifles, pistols/ the latter does not take into account 
Denmark, UK, Netherlands, revolvers* exports to the US, which according to the 
Germany, ThailandX export report are Ôestimated to account 
for over half of CanadaÕs exports of 
military goodsÕ (Canada, 2002, p.8). 
China 9.0m* US, Bangladesh, Iran, Sporting/hunting rifles, International customs data probably  
SAS estimate: USD 100m Germany, Canada* shotguns, pistols/ underestimate actual exports, as China  
revolvers, parts sporting/ does not report on many of its exports, 
hunting weapons, and hence figures are based on  
ammunition* importersÕ reporting.
Czech Republic 52.3m* US, Germany, Yemen, Ammunition, pistols/ 
France, Slovakia* revolvers, sporting/
hunting rifles, parts 
pistols/revolvers*
Finland 30.7m* US, Sweden, Germany, Ammunition, sporting/ Customs and export report data diverge 
EUR 2.9m (USD 2.6m)X UK, Italy* hunting rifles, shotguns, probably largely because civilian  
parts sporting/hunting weapons are excluded from the export   
Sweden, Italy, Germany, weapons, military report. 
US, New ZealandX weapons*
France At least 33.7m* Saudi Arabia, US, Norway, Military weapons, The discrepancy between customs and 
EUR 18.5m (USD 16.6m)X Portugal, Russia* ammunition, parts export report data is difficult to explain.  
sporting/hunting Does not report trade in military weapons,
Romania, Belgium, weapons, sporting/ pistols, parts of revolvers and pistols to  
Saudi Arabia, Germany, hunting rifles* Comtrade. Hence the value is likely to be 
Malaysia, USX underestimated. The export report data 
excludes ammunition and parts, but 
includes some non-SALW because certain 
categories do not contain purely SALW. 
Germany At least 156.7m* US, Switzerland, France, Pistols/revolvers, Does not report trade in military weapons
Spain, Austria* ammunition, sporting/ to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to 
hunting rifles, parts be underestimated. 
sporting/hunting Publishes an export report, but it includes
weapons, parts pistols/ information on granted export licences,   
revolvers* not actual deliveries of SALW.
Iran Medium producer, but little is known about its exports
Israel At least 23.2m* US, Botswana, Brazil, Pistols/revolvers, International customs data probably 
Guatemala, Germany* ammunition, military underestimates actual exports, as Israel   
weapons, parts pistols/ does not report most of its exports, and 
revolvers, parts sporting/ hence figures are based on importersÕ 
hunting weapons* reports.
Italy At least 298.7m* US, Belgium, France, Shotguns, ammunition, Does not report trade in military weapons
Germany, UK* pistols/revolvers, parts to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to 
sporting/hunting be underestimated. 
weapons* Publishes an export report, but it includes
information on licences, not deliveries of 
SALW. 
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Table 4.1 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 
(most recent complete yearly data available)
Country USD value customs Main known recipients Main known types  Remarks
data (Comtrade)*/ (listed in order of of SALW exported
Export report (2001 if importance) 
not otherwise stated)
Japan 70.3m* US, Belgium, France, Sporting/hunting rifles, Produces only non-military firearms. 
Germany, Canada* parts sporting/hunting 
weapons, shotguns, 
shotgun barrels, 
ammunition*
Mexico At least 14.2m* US, Venezuela, Argentina, Parts sporting/hunting Does not report trade in military weapons,
Paraguay, France* weapons, shotgun barrels, pistols, and some parts to Comtrade.   
ammunition, shotguns* Hence the value is likely to be 
underestimated.
Norway 13.7m* Switzerland, US, Italy, Ammunition, military Customs and export report data diverge 
NOK 0.5m (USD 60,000)X Sweden, Finland* weapons, shotguns, probably largely because it is difficult to  
pistols/revolvers* fully distinguish SALW from non-SALW 
(especially ammunition) in the export 
report.
Pakistan Medium producer, but little is known about its exports
Portugal At least 44.8m* US, Belgium, Spain, Italy Sporting/hunting rifles, Does not report trade in military weapons
Greece* parts sporting/hunting to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to   
weapons, shotguns, be underestimated. 
shotgun barrels, Publishes an export report, but  it does not
ammunition* detail the SALW share of arms exports. 
Romania At least 4.2m* US, Switzerland, Senegal, Sporting/hunting rifles, The export report figure and the Comtrade
15.4 mX Italy, Czech Republic* military weapons, figure diverge because Romania does not 
ammunition, parts report its customs data to Comtrade, and   
sporting/hunting hence figures are based on importersÕ 
weapons, pistols/revolvers* reporting. 
Russia At least 42.2m* US, Cyprus, Algeria, Shotguns, ammunition, International customs data probably  
Estimate based on Germany, Lebanon* sporting/hunting rifles, underestimate actual exports, as Russia 
official information: no pistols/revolvers* does not report its exports, and hence  
more than 130m Vietnam, Malaysia, figures are based on importersÕ reporting.
(Pyadushkin, 2003, p. 24). Bhutan, Indonesia, This explains the large discrepancy  
Afghanistan (Northern between the customs data figure and the   
Alliance), Ethiopia figure obtained through exporting 
(Pyadushkin, 2003, p.24) companies.
Saudi Arabia 13.2m* Germany, France, US, Parts sporting/hunting Does not produce large quantities of  
United Arab Emirates, weapons, shotguns, weapons. Much of the apparent exports   
Kuwait* ammunition, military are probably transfers due to servicing  
weapons, shotgun barrels* and repairs. Some might also be 
re-export or transit. 
Singapore Medium producer, but little is known about its exports
South Africa At least 12.5m* US, Colombia, Germany, Ammunition, military The discrepancy between customs and  
ZAR 81m (USD 9.5m)X India, Mexico* weapons, pistols/ export report data is difficult to explain. 
revolvers, sporting/ Does not report customs data to Comtrade.
hunting rifles* Hence, the value is likely to be under-
estimated.
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Table 4.1 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms exports of the most important known exporters, 2001 
(most recent complete yearly data available)
Country USD value customs Main known recipients Main known types  Remarks
data (Comtrade)*/ (listed in order of of SALW exported
Export report (2001 if importance) 
not otherwise stated)
South Korea 29.7m* Venezuela, US, Ethiopia, Ammunition, military 
Australia, Turkey* weapons, parts pistols/
revolvers, parts sporting/
hunting weapons, pistols/
revolvers*
Spain At least 65.3m* Saudi Arabia, US, Ammunition, shotguns, Does not report trade in military weapons
EUR 42.9m (USD 38.5m)X Portugal, UK, France* parts pistols/revolvers, to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to  
pistols/revolvers* be underestimated.
The discrepancy between the export report
figure and the Comtrade figure is most  
likely due to differing definitions of SALW.
Sweden At least 24.1 m* US, Norway, Austria, Ammunition, military Does not report trade in military weapons
SEK 5m (USD 0.5m)X Denmark, Finland* weapons, parts sporting/ to Comtrade. Hence, the value is likely to 
hunting weapons, be underestimated.
sporting/hunting rifles* Discrepancies probably arise because  
Sweden uses a restrictive definition of 
SALW in its export report (excluding light
weapons), and does not separate small arms
ammunition from other types of ammunition.
Switzerland 48.1m* Germany, Singapore, Ammunition, parts Discrepancies in total amounts of SALW  
CHF 11.7m (USD 6.9m)X Romania, US, Canada* sporting/hunting exports and main destinations may arise 
weapons, pistols/ because SALW ammunition cannot be 
Germany, US, Malaysia, revolvers, military distinguished from other types of   
Italy, FranceX weapons, sporting/ ammunition in the export report, and is 
hunting rifles* therefore not included in the export 
report numbers. 
Turkey 21.4m* US, Italy, Germany, Shotguns, parts 
Lebanon, France* sporting/hunting 
weapons, ammunition, 
sporting/hunting rifles, 
military weapons* 
UK 44.8m* US, Saudi Arabia, Military weapons, Publishes an export report, but does not 
Australia, Denmark, ammunition, shotguns, detail the value of SALW exports. Instead   
Belgium* sporting/hunting rifles* it provides numbers of certain types of 
SALW exported.
US 741.4m* Japan, South Korea, Military weapons,  Publishes an export report, but it includes
Saudi Arabia, Canada, ammunition, pistols/ information on granted export licences,
Italy* revolvers, sporting/ not actual deliveries of SALW.
hunting rifles*
Notes: Only countries with known or estimated yearly sales of more than USD 10 million have been included in the listing.
* UN Comtrade, 2001 figures (the latest available), customs codes 930100 (military weapons), 930200 (revolvers and pistols), 930320 (shotguns),
930330 (sporting and hunting rifles), 930510 (parts and accessories of revolvers and pistols), 930521 (shotgun barrels), 930529 (parts and accessories 
of shotguns or rifles), 930590 (parts and accessories of military weapons), 930621 (shotgun cartridges), 930630 (small arms ammunition).
X Export report
Source: NISAT (2003)
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Box 4.1 Defining and counting SALW: A proposal for a new approach    
Cased, palletized, or containerized, SALW are routinely forwarded by commercial carriers, along with (and sometimes inside)
cargoes of other more innocent goods coming either from the more than 90 countries where their main manufacturers are
located (PRODUCERS) or from second-hand markets. In previous research on the logistics of arms transfers and the transport
companies servicing the arms trade,9 we attempted to evaluate the market size of SALW transport and developed a database
on SALW flows and trade lanes for 1994—2001. We based the flow-charts on the records in UN Comtrade, according to a method-
ology based on the cross-analysis of importer and exporter declarations.10
In this box we present some of our findings and, in particular, data on trends and flows of (a) goods under those customs
categories that mostly include SALW and related ammunition (here referred to as the A9 Group11); (b) goods under those cus-
toms categories that include SALW among other items (B2 Group 12); and (c) goods under those customs categories for which we
believe there is a SALW association even though they are not usually considered as such (C213).
The overall size of SALW trade obviously depends on how they are defined but, given the total value of A9 and C2 Groups and
part of B2Õs, its value could be said to range, in annual average, between USD 5 billion and 7 billion, similar to the trade, for
example, in sports footwear (USD 5 billion—6 billion) or frozen fish (USD 7 billion—8 billion).
Our findings show that, in 1994—2001 and in constant 2001 terms,14 transfers of SALW of the A9 Group totalled USD 24.9 billion,
with an annual average of USD 3.1 billion. In the same period, transfers of weapons of the B2 Group reached USD 37.4 billion, at
an annual average of USD 4.7 billion. Transfers of C2 Group totalled USD 3.1 billion, at an annual average of USD 385 million. The
A9 Group is most similar to the definition of SALW used elsewhere in this chapter. The difference in value (2.4 billion versus
2.8 billion) is mainly due to the fact that the two include slightly different categories of SALW.
Within the A9 Group, transfers of parts and accessories account for nearly 27 per cent of the total; non-military firearms for
21 per cent; cartridges and parts thereof for nearly 20 per cent; and military revolvers and pistols account for an additional 12
per cent. The United States, Italy, and Germany ranked in the first positions as exporters, with USD 6.7 billion, 3 billion, and 2 bil-
lion, respectively, in sales during 1994—2001. In the first ten positions ranked also the United Kingdom, Belgium—Luxembourg
(reporting jointly), Brazil, France, Austria, Switzerland, and Japan, together accounting for more than 70 per cent of the trade. 
The B2 Group is composed of military weapons and munitions, which include SALW items such as machine guns, military
rifles, rocket and grenade launchers, mines, mortars, and man-portable guided missiles15 and their ammunition. It also includes
howitzers, aircraft bombs, anti-tank air-to-air missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes, parts, and munitions, which obviously cannot
be considered SALW. It is not possible to know the SALW proportion in the B2 Group for the relevant years, but in the only sep-
arate account that exists, for 2002,16 out of an overall total of USD 525.6 million, transfers of self- and non-self-propelled artillery
were worth USD 175.7 millions; transfers of rocket and grenade launchers, torpedo tubes, and similar items reached USD 159.6
million; and items such as military rifles, shotguns, and machine guns totalled USD 190.3 million. Failing to consider at least part
of B2 Group transfers as SALW trade leads to a severe underestimation of the value of SALW and renders items included in the
UN definition of SALW unaccounted for. The United States (USD 17 billion) and United Kingdom (USD 5.2 billion) ranked in the first
two positions, accounting for nearly 60 per cent of the trade.
The C2 Group combines swords, bayonets, and so forth, with air guns, rifles, pistols, and truncheons. The former are consid-
ered Ôarms of warÕ, the latter non-military arms. Neither comes under the UN definition.17 Nevertheless, knives and bayonets are
standard complements of many assault rifles and are widely used by special forces and insurgents,18 while machetes have found
tragic use in civil wars in countries such as Algeria, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, to name just a few. Airguns, rifles,
and pistols not only could be as lethal as firearms over a certain energy level,19 but are regularly used for military and law-
enforcement training 20 in addition to being a fast-growing ÔintroductoryÕ market for prominent SALW manufacturers.21
Table 4.2 A9/B2/C2 Groups: value of transfers 1994—2001, in constant 2001 USD millions
Group 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total Average 
A9 3,477 3,515 3,409 2,344 3,097 2,857 2,827 2,839 24,365 3,046
B2 4,787 4,207 4,516 5,175 5,532 4,749 4,935 3,482 37,383 4,673
C2 599 566 804 178 253 209 227 248 3,084 386
Total 8,863 8,288 8,729 7,697 8,882 7,815 7,989 6,569 64,832 8,104
Source: AuthorsÕ database; see fn. 10
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Small arms imports
It is even more difficult to give a complete picture of imports than of exports, for several reasons. First, estimates such
as that made for China above cannot easily be made for imports, as demand is harder to model than supply. Modelling
demand would require thorough knowledge of the procurement levels of civilians, armed forces, and law enforcement
agencies worldwide. Second, although arms export reports are becoming increasingly common, they only very rarely
detail arms imports (although this may be about to change).22 Reliable sources are hence fewer. In Table 4.3, therefore,
we rely on international customs data only. Such data do not record all state-to-state transfers since these do not always
pass through customs. Similarly to the export data presented above, the picture of imports is incomplete also because
some states do not report imports at all, and some under-report them (that is, report only on certain categories of
small arms). Again, we have relied on mirror data to complement deficient import reports.
Table 4.3 shows that the largest importer of small arms by value in 2001 was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the US. It was fol-
lowed by Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Canada. The structure of imports for these countries varied
substantially: while in Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Japan, and South Korea military weapons were the most important import
category, US imports were topped by shotguns, and Germany and Canada imported mostly small arms ammunition.
Of these importers, Cyprus is perhaps the most astonishing, given the small size of the island. The value of the guns is
simply too large to be explained by local demand or international peacekeeping operations—1,248 men in 2003 (IISS, 2003)—
but probably reflects an important, though opaque, transit trade. As noted in Small Arms Survey (2003, p. 105), Cyprus is a
problematic destination for small arms transfers, not only because of the unsettled status of the island, but also as it is very
unclear what happens to the large quantities of weapons that enter it every year. Russia, Italy, and Spain are important
exporters to this country. As noted in the previous section, Saudi Arabia is a prominent importer, even though some of the
small arms imports recorded in the customs data might have gone to US troops stationed in the country until recently.
Among medium-sized importers, Colombia, Israel, Lebanon, and Venezuela are problematic because of their internal sit-
uations. In a press release from August 2003, the Latin American organization Desarme (2003) strongly criticized European
exports to Venezuela under the title ‘European Firearms in Venezuela: No Code, No Conduct’. The organization claims that
exports from EU countries such as Austria and Belgium violate the EU Code of Conduct (EU, 1998), given that firearms
owned by state structures often end up in the hands of the pro-President Hugo Chávez Círculos Bolivarianos, the recently
created Frente Bolivariano de Liberación, and the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia
(FARC). The widespread civilian unrest in the country should also lead to restraint in small arms exports, Desarme argues.
The largest
importers by value
in 2001 were the
United States, Saudi
Arabia, Cyprus,
Japan, South Korea,
Germany, and
Canada.
Box 4.1 (cont.) Defining and counting SALWÑa proposal for a new approach    
It seems unlikely that, between 1994 and 2001, countries such as Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka, all involved in
bloody civil wars, bought millions of dollars of cutlasses and bayonets for peaceful purposes, and air guns and pistols for the
enjoyment of their youth. Imports of swords and bayonets reached USD 1.6 million in Algeria (1.2 million from China in 1998) and
USD 14.2 million in Sri Lanka (13.7 million from Iran in 2000), while imports of airguns totalled USD 2.3 million in Algeria (1.8 mil-
lion from Belarus in 1998), USD 4.5 million in Angola (3.9 million from Belarus in 1998), USD 9.3 million in Indonesia (mostly from
the Republic of Korea), USD 5.3 million in Sri Lanka (3.8 million from Czech Republic between 1997 and 1998). Finally, a testi-
mony of the worrisome side of C2 Group trade is that in 1994—2001 the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom, among
others, classified hundreds of millions of dollars of imports and exports of these items. Between 1994 and 1998, in particular,
the Netherlands kept the origin of USD 633 million of imports and the destinations of USD 732 million of exports classified.
Written by Sergio Finardi and Carlo Tombola
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Other possibly large importers on which little data is available, and whose imports are likely illicit rather than
authorized (and which do not figure in Table 4.3) are those states involved in (internal or international) conflict, such
as Liberia, Ivory Coast, Russia (Chechnya), Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Burundi, Algeria, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. Details of exports to some of these countries and insurgent groups are
found in the section on small arms transfers and human rights below.
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Table 4.3 Annual authorized small arms imports, by country with most recent yearly data available (2001)
Country USD value Main known suppliers Main known types of Remarks 
(top five) SALW imported
Argentina 13.8m US, Brazil, Italy, Ammunition, pistols/ 
Switzerland, Spain revolvers, hunting/sporting 
rifles, shotguns
Australia 62.8m US, Belgium, Italy, Ammunition, military 
UK, Germany weapons, shotguns, pistols/ 
revolvers, hunting/sporting 
rifles
Austria 22.9m Germany, Sweden, Ammunition, shotguns, Does not report on its imports of military 
Belgium, Italy, hunting/sporting rifles, weapons and pistols/revolvers through    
Switzerland parts of hunting/sporting international customs data. Hence the value is  
rifles, military weapons possibly underestimated.
Belgium 64.3m Italy, Portugal, US, Shotguns, ammunition, Does not report on its imports of military  
Japan, Germany hunting/sporting rifles, weapons and pistols/revolvers through 
pistols/revolvers international customs data. Hence the value is 
possibly underestimated. Parts of imports 
might actually be returns for repairs. 
Brazil 11.3m US, Israel, Chile, Italy, Military weapons, Does not report on its imports of military 
France ammunition, shotguns, weapons through international customs data 
hunting/sporting rifles, parts (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is 
pistols/revolvers possibly underestimated.
Canada 99.9m US, Switzerland, Austria, Ammunition, parts sporting/
Italy, Germany hunting weapons, hunting/ 
sporting rifles, pistols/ 
revolvers 
Colombia 21.6m US, Brazil, Italy, Military weapons, ammunition, Does not report on its imports of shotguns 
South Africa, pistols/revolvers, shotguns through international customs data (reliance 
Czech Republic on mirror data). Hence the value is possibly 
underestimated. 
Cyprus 159.8m Unspecified country, Military weapons, shotguns, ÔUnspecified countryÕ means that the exporter  
Russia, Italy, Spain, ammunition, hunting/ is kept classified. 
Japan sporting rifles
Denmark 20.5m Germany, Canada, UK, Ammunition, parts sporting/
Sweden, Italy hunting weapons, shotguns, 
hunting/sporting rifles 
Finland 14.0m Italy, Germany, Sweden, Ammunition, shotguns, parts 
US, Norway of sporting/hunting weapons,
hunting/sporting rifles 
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Table 4.3 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms imports, by country with most recent yearly data available (2001)
Country USD value Main known suppliers Main known types of Remarks 
(top five) SALW imported
France 72.5m Italy, Belgium, Germany, Shotguns, hunting/sporting Does not report on its imports of military 
US, Saudi Arabia rifles, ammunition, parts weapons and pistols/revolvers through  
sporting/hunting weapons international customs data. Hence the value 
is possibly underestimated.
Saudi Arabia probably appears as supplier 
because of repairs/refitting. 
Germany 104.2m US, Italy, Switzerland, Ammunition, parts sporting/ Does not report on its imports of military 
Saudi Arabia, Belgium hunting weapons, shotguns, weapons and shotguns through international  
pistols/revolvers, hunting/ customs data. Hence the value is possibly 
sporting rifles underestimated.
Saudi Arabia probably appears as supplier 
because of repairs/refitting. 
Greece 48.2m US, Italy, Germany, Military weapons, shotguns, Does not report on its imports of military 
Portugal, Spain ammunition, pistols/ weapons and pistols/revolvers through  
revolvers international customs data. Hence the value is 
possibly underestimated.
Honduras 10.8m Italy, US, Uruguay, Military weapons, pistols/ 
Israel, Argentina revolvers, ammunition, 
hunting/sporting rifles
Israel 18.7m US, Italy, South Korea, Military weapons, parts of Does not report any imports through 
Czech Republic, Spain sporting/hunting weapons, international customs data (reliance on mirror 
ammunition, parts pistols/ data). Hence the value is probably 
revolvers, pistols/revolvers underestimated. 
Italy 74.3m US, Germany, Belgium, Military weapons, ammunition, Does not report on its imports of military 
Turkey, Switzerland hunting/sporting rifles, parts weapons through international customs data
hunting/sporting weapons, (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is  
pistols/revolvers possibly underestimated.
Japan 151.0m US, Germany, Italy, Military weapons, ammunition,
Spain, Australia shotguns, pistols/revolvers
Kuwait 11.8 m US, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Military weapons, ammunition, Does not report any imports through 
Australia parts pistols/revolvers international customs data (reliance on  
shotguns mirror data). Hence the value is probably 
underestimated. 
Lebanon 12.3m Italy, Cyprus, Russia, Shotguns, hunting/sporting Does not report on its imports of military 
Turkey, France rifles, ammunition, parts weapons through international customs data 
sporting/hunting weapons (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is 
possibly underestimated. 
Mexico 20.0m US, Greece, Italy, Spain, Ammunition, pistol/revolvers,
Belgium military weapons, shotguns
Netherlands 12.1m US, Canada, Switzerland, Ammunition, parts sporting/ Does not report on its imports of military
Germany, Belgium hunting weapons, military weapons and pistols/revolvers through
weapons, shotguns international customs data. Hence the value 
is possibly underestimated.
Norway 23.3m Sweden, US, Germany, Ammunition, hunting/sporting
Italy, France rifles, shotguns, parts 
sporting/hunting weapons
Portugal 33.6m Belgium, Spain, Italy, Parts sporting/hunting 
US, Germany weapons, shotguns, shotgun 
barrels, ammunition, hunting/
sporting rifles
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Table 4.3 (cont.) Annual authorized small arms imports, by country with most recent yearly data available (2001)
Country USD value Main known suppliers Main known types of Remarks 
(top five) SALW imported
Saudi Arabia 261.3m Belgium, US, Spain, Military weapons, ammunition,
Bulgaria, France parts pistols/revolvers, 
shotguns
South Korea 105.7m US, Italy, Germany, Military weapons, ammunition,
Russia, Spain pistols/revolvers, shotguns
Spain 36.7m Italy, US, Germany, Shotguns, hunting/sporting Does not report on its imports of military 
Belgium, Portugal rifles, pistols/revolvers, weapons through international customs data. 
ammunition Hence the value is possibly underestimated.
Sweden 22.2m Finland, US, Germany, Ammunition, shotguns, Does not report on its imports of military 
Austria, Italy hunting/sporting rifles, weapons through international customs data
parts of sporting/hunting (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is  
weapons, military weapons possibly underestimated.
Switzerland 36.0m Germany, Norway, US, Ammunition, pistols/revolvers,
Italy, Austria parts sporting/hunting 
weapons, military weapons, 
shotguns
Taiwan 19.7m US, South Korea, Italy, Military weapons, ammunition,
Spain, Germany shotguns, pistols/revolvers, 
parts pistols/revolvers
Thailand 18.7m US, Czech Republic, Pistols/revolvers, ammunition, Does not report on its imports of military
Germany, Singapore, military weapons, shotguns weapons through international customs data  
Greece (reliance on mirror data). Hence the value is 
possibly underestimated.
Turkey 20.1m Italy, Singapore, Military weapons, ammunition,
Poland, Slovakia, Spain pistols/revolvers, parts 
sporting/hunting weapons
United Arab 32.4m US, Switzerland, Military weapons, ammunition, Does not report any imports through 
Emirates Germany, Brazil, pistols/revolvers hunting/ international customs data (reliance on 
Czech Republic sporting rifles mirror data). Hence the value is probably 
underestimated.
United Kingdom 78.3m US, Italy, Belgium, Shotguns, military weapons, 
Spain, Germany ammunition, hunting/
sporting rifles
US 602.5m Italy, Brazil, Japan, Shotguns, pistols/revolvers, 
Austria, Germany hunting/sporting rifles, 
ammunition, parts sporting/
hunting weapons
Venezuela 31.0m South Korea, US, Ammunition, pistols/revolvers,
Austria, Italy, Spain shotguns, hunting/sporting 
rifles
Source: NISAT (2003)
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It is unclear
whether the 
moratorium has 
had any effects 
on authorized
transfers in the
ECOWAS region.
Box 4.2 Business as usual? The ECOWAS moratorium and authorized transfers
On 31 October 1998, the heads of state of ECOWAS proclaimed a moratorium on the import, export, and production of all small
arms and light weapons within the region.23 The moratorium, which originally ran for three years, was renewed for another three
years in 2001, and it will be up for renewal yet again in the autumn of 2004. The ban is far-reaching: not only private companies
but also ECOWAS governments that want to import small arms need an exemption in order to do so. The UN Programme for
Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) is supposed to support the implementation of the mora-
torium. International support for the measure has been widespread, particularly at the outset. A number of EU governments
(including France and the UK) as well as Canada have been among the financial supporters of the moratorium (Ogunbanwo,
2002). Support has also come from the UN and its various specialized agencies (UNSC, 2000b, p. 31).
The moratorium notwith-
standing, officials in the region
Ôacknowledge the existence of
a large, and largely uncon-
trolled informal weapons trade
and outright illicit traffickingÕ
going Ôfar beyond normal levels
of informal tradeÕ (quoted in
UNSC, 2000b, p. 31). This illicit
trade is probably best docu-
mented in a series of UN Security
Council reports on embargo
violations in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Angola (UNSC
2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002) as
well as in reports by Global
Witness (2001, 2003) and Human
Rights Watch (2001a, 2003).
These reports show that there are well-organized networks trading simultaneously in arms, diamonds, timber, and other com-
modities, and making use of the lax regulations in particular in transport systems surveillance. In March 2003, the UN Security
Council expressed Ôits profound concern at the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as mercenary
activities, on peace and security in West AfricaÕ (UNSC, 2003c).
However, there is also an ongoing authorized trade between the countries under the ECOWAS moratorium and the outside
world, which has not been mentioned in assessments of the moratorium such as by Ebo and Mazal (2003) and Ogunbanwo
(2002). For a transfer to the region to be in agreement with the moratorium, the importer has to request an exemption from
the moratorium from other ECOWAS governments before importing small arms. Some exporting countries have adopted a
policy of seeking assurances that exemptions have been granted before authorizing exports to ECOWAS countries. Table 4.4
lists transfers to the ECOWAS region, reported in international customs data, which shows a rather substantial authorized trade
in small arms and ammunition with ECOWAS states. The data on transfers does not square with publicly available information
on exemptions granted (Ebo with Mazal, 2003, p. 20; Ogunbanwo 2002, p. 14).
Table 4.4 is not meant to be exhaustive. The true extent of the authorized trade is in all likelihood greater, given that many
ECOWAS states do not report their customs data internationally. Other sources, such as British and other export reports as well as,
for example, Berman (2003), report on additional authorized transfers. It is therefore unclear what, if any, effects the moratorium
has had on authorized transfers in the region.
West African leaders stand as the ECOWAS anthem is played at a meeting in Ghana in September 2002.
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Table 4.4 Authorized imports of SALW to ECOWAS countries, 1999—2002
Importing Main exporting countries, value in USD, years Comments (types of SALW traded, quantities/values) 
ECOWAS country
Benin Burkina Faso: 21,840 in 1999—2001 Reported imports of mostly revolvers and pistols from Burkina Faso
France: 10,900 in 1999—2001 Revolvers and pistols, sporting rifles, and shotguns from France.
Burkina Faso Italy: 856,315 for 1999—2002 Italy reported exports of mainly cartridges, but also
Czech Republic: 155,384 for 1999—2001 revolvers and pistols and sporting rifles.
France: 75,982 in 1999—2002
Spain: 66,645 in 1999—2001
Senegal: 55,394 in 2002
Cap Verde Czech Republic: 27,595 in 2001 Reported imports of revolvers and pistols.
Portugal: 13,101 in 1999—2001
Cte dÕIvoire South Africa: 1,225,081 in 1999 South Africa reported exports of mostly cartridges but also 
Spain: 76,391 in 2001 military weapons, revolvers/pistols, and shotguns.
Italy: 60,550 in 1999—2001 Spain and the Czech Republic reported exports of only cartridges.
US: 48,889 in 1999—2001 Revolvers/pistols and shotguns reported from Italy.
Czech Republic: 38,051 in 2001—02 Military weapons and cartridges reported from the US.
France: 27,886 in 1999—2001 France reported exports of mainly shotguns and Switzerland 
Switzerland: 12,104 in 1999—2001 revolvers/pistols.
The Gambia United Kingdom: 449,145 in 1999 UK reported exports of parts and accessories of military
Czech Republic: 120,961 in 1999—2002 weapons, cartridges.
Russia: 31,134 in 1999 Reported imports of cartridges from the Czech Republic,  
Poland: 28,107 in 2000 Russia, and Poland.
Lebanon: 10,760 in 2001 Lebanon reported exports of sporting rifles. 
Ghana Spain: 7,249,315 for 1999—2001 SpainÕs and FranceÕs reported exports consist of cartridges,
US: 2,823,245 in 1999—2002 and the UKÕs of mainly cartridges.
UK: 2,156,203 in 1999—2001 US reported exports mainly of shotguns, cartridges, 
Cyprus: 2,093,385 in 1999—2001 and military weapons.
South Africa: 1,473,985 in 1999 Cyprus and Germany report exporting mainly shotguns.
Germany: 131,099 in 1999—2000 South Africa reports exports of cartridges, military weapons,
France: 52,909 in 1999 and shotguns.
Guinea France: 3,342,698 in 1999—2001 France exported cartridges, sporting rifles, military weapons, 
Spain: 1,563,183 in 1999—2001 shotguns, and parts and accessories from France.
United Kingdom: 325,601 in 1999 Only cartridges from Spain and the UK.
Croatia:  258,949 in 2000 Croatia reported exporting military weapons.
Portugal: 231,845 in 1999—2001 Portugal reported exporting cartridges and shotguns.
Germany: 83,358 in 1999—2000 Only shotguns from Germany.
Brazil: 42,731 in 1999 Only cartridges from Brazil and Senegal.
Senegal: 20,580 in 2000 Czech Republic reported exporting cartridges.
Czech Republic: 15,391 in 1999 Georgia reported exporting parts and accessories.
Georgia: 12,000 in 2000
Guinea-Bissau Portugal: 332,054 in 1999—2001 Portugal reported exports of cartridges, shotguns, 
Spain: 168,912 in 2000—1 revolvers/pistols, and sporting rifles.
France: 104,620 in 1999—2002 Spain and France reported exports of cartridges.
Liberia Under UN embargo, no imports therefore authorized
Mali France: 72,327 in 1999—2002 France reported exports of mainly parts and accessories.
Niger South Korea: 492,500 in 1999 South Korea reported exports of military weapons.
France: 92,134 in 1999—2002 Reported imports of revolvers, shotguns, parts and accessories,   
Italy: 60,643 in 1999—2001 and cartridges from France; France reported exporting 
sporting rifles, cartridges, and shotguns. Reported imports 
of shotguns from Italy; Italy reported exporting revolvers.
Box 4.2 (cont.) Business as usual? The ECOWAS moratorium and authorized transfers
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DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSPARENCY: ANNUAL UPDATE
Transparency in the arms trade has three dimensions: intergovernmental transparency, parliamentary transparency,
and public transparency (Bauer, 2003). Intergovernmental transparency consists of exchanges of information between
governments, such as the information exchange on small arms and light weapons imports and exports among par-
ticipating states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the exchange of information on
various types of armaments within the Wassenaar Arrangement. Neither of these organizations makes public the infor-
mation exchanged, even if individual states can choose to make their contributions to the exchange public (and have
done so). Parliamentary transparency means that the government shares information on its export and import decisions
with national parliamentarians. Both these forms of transparency can be combined with public transparency, meaning
that information about arms transfers is released to the general public.
Transparency in the trade in small arms can constitute an important early-warning and confidence-building device,
in particular in contexts where few major weapons are available (for example, in some parts of Africa and in many inter-
nal conflicts). It is important in enabling the general public to effectively monitor whether states follow international
agreements and guidelines as well as their own laws and regulations on small arms exports and imports. Without trans-
parency, citizens, parliamentarians, NGOs, and other governments cannot verify whether international commitments
Table 4.4 (cont.) Authorized imports of SALW to ECOWAS countries, 1999—2002
Importing Main exporting countries, value in USD,  years Comments (types of SALW traded, quantities/values) 
ECOWAS country
Nigeria India: 2,799,653 in 2001 India reported exporting cartridges.
Israel: 2,385,595 in 1999 Reports imports of shotguns from Israel.
South Korea: 1,056,356 in 1999—2001 Reports imports of military weapons and revolvers from South Korea;
Indonesia: 597,500 in 1999 South Korea reports exports of military weapons.
US: 246, 007 in 1999—2002 US reported exporting mainly cartridges.
Brazil: 126,793 in 2000—01 Germany and Indonesia reported exporting revolvers/pistols.
UK: 90,953 in 1999—2002 Brazil reported exporting sporting rifles and cartridges.
Italy: 49,074 in 2001 UK reported exporting shotguns, cartridges, and parts.
Australia: 20,243 in 2001 Italy reported exporting revolvers and shotguns.
Germany: 13,062 in 1999 Australia reported exporting only revolvers.
Senegal France: 2,246,810 in 1999—2002 Only cartridges from Spain.
US: 959,420 for 1999—2002 Mainly revolvers and cartridges from Germany.
Spain: 426,508 for 2000—2002 Diversified imports from France, US, Italy, and Brazil. 
Italy: 232,992 for 1999—2002 Cartridges, revolvers/pistols and shotguns from
Brazil: 203,754 for 1999—2002 the Czech Republic.
Germany: 116,770 for 1999—2002
Czech Republic: 81,996 in 2001—02
Sierra Leone Lebanon: 196,949 in 2001 Lebanon reported exports of military weapons.
(only rebels are US: 29,542 in 2001 The US reported exports of parts and accessories.
under UN embargo) Spain: 13,398 in 2001 Spain and the UK reported exports of cartridges.
UK: 10,139 in 2000
Togo Spain: 41,212 in 2000 Spain reported exporting cartridges.
Note: The figures are likely underestimates of the total trade, as some important exporters and some of the ECOWAS states do not report on their 
trade, and we have thus had to rely on mirror data. Cut-off point for inclusion in table: USD 10,000 over four-year period covered.
Source: UN Comtrade, download date: July—August 2003
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are being met (Bauer, 2002), nor can they check whether arms transactions are free from corruption (Courtney,
2002).24 More generally, without transparency, it is impossible to obtain an accurate picture of the small arms trade.25
The importance of transparency in the small arms and light weapons trade is increasingly acknowledged in mul-
tilateral forums. In December 2003, the Wassenaar Arrangement participating states added small arms and light
weapons, including MANPADS, to the list of strategic goods on which they exchange information (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2003). 
There have also long been calls to include small arms into the UN Register of Conventional Arms, especially from
the African continent, where these types of weapons are crucial tools of war. In summer 2003, a group of governmental
experts from more than 20 countries charged with the periodic review of the functioning of the Register proposed
that the large-calibre artillery category be expanded to include smaller artillery pieces equal to or above 75mm (such
as the very common 81mm and 82mm mortars). The expert group also proposed that the missile/launcher category
should encompass MANPADS. The proposal won the UN General Assembly’s approval in December 2003 (UNGA,
2003a). This means that some light weapons are now included in the information exchange, while all small arms (as
per the UN definition) remain outside its scope. However, the group of experts recommended a voluntary sharing of
information through the UN on transfers of all small arms and light weapons ‘made or modified to military specifica-
tion and intended for military use’ (UNGA, 2003b, para. 113(e)). The main argument underlying such efforts is that it
is important to push transparency levels in the SALW trade to the same level as trade in major conventional weapon
systems. This is already the case in some regional forums. As already noted, since 2002 the OSCE participating states
have exchanged information yearly on a number of small arms issues, notably transfers.26
Here, key information on levels of transparency of the larger small arms exporters (hence not all states) has been
assembled in a Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer (Table 4.5). A discussion on transparency on the small arms
issue generally is found elsewhere in this volume (MEASURES).
The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer
Assessing and comparing countries’ export reports is complicated, as their formats differ widely: from a few pages of sta-
tistics to several hundred pages of text and tables. The basic question around which the Small Arms Trade Transparency
Barometer is constructed is: how useful is the export report for understanding a country’s small arms exports? The barom-
eter is divided into two main categories: (a) access, clarity, and comprehensiveness; and (b) information on granted and
refused licences and on deliveries. The first category assesses how easy it is to obtain and understand the data provided
by a state, and how comprehensive it is in general terms. The underlying assumption is that data which is difficult to access
(because it is not available in any major language, not found on the Internet, and/or is not free of charge), difficult to
decipher (because there is no methodology, no information on end-users, and it is impossible to distinguish small arms
and small arms ammunition from other types of weapons and ammunition), or incomplete (because it does not cover all
types of transactions, or all kinds of small arms and parts) is of limited use in understanding a country’s small arms trade.
The second cluster of criteria relates to the detail of the data provided in a report on granted licences, denied licences, and
actual deliveries. The analysis of granted and denied licences and deliveries is subdivided in the same way: values and vol-
umes disaggregated by weapon type and by both country and weapon type. The data is disaggregated by weapon type if
the share of arms exports of different categories of weapons is detailed (in the Romanian export report, for example,
the breakdown of arms exports is shown: 15 per cent aircraft and related equipment, 13 per cent bombs, rockets, and
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missiles, and so forth). The data is disaggregated both by country and by weapon if it is possible to read out the quantity/
value of weapons of each category transferred to individual recipients (for example the Swiss report shows it exported
CHF 880,000 (USD 570,000) of small arms to Egypt in 2002).27 As a rule, one point is given to an export report for each
criterion fulfilled.28 A criterion that is only partly fulfilled is given half a point. For example, under the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment’s classification system, the first category of weapons consists purely of small arms, while the second category contains
both small arms and light weapons and larger weapons systems. Hence, it is only partially possible to distinguish small
arms and light weapons from other types of weapons, and only half a point is attributed on that particular criterion.
It is important to stress that the barometer evaluates the reporting, and cannot independently verify the veracity
of the information given. In other words, the barometer assesses the quantity, precision, and usefulness of the data
made public, but not its truthfulness.
The number of countries releasing some form of public data on their arms exports continues to increase. Countries
that produce arms export reports generally provide the most comprehensive information, but some countries that do
not (yet) publish such reports provide valuable information on small arms transactions through the international
release of customs data. Although international customs data is not necessarily thought of as a transparency device,
it provides important insights into trade, and is therefore included in the analysis on transparency in this section.
Customs data fills some of the gaps in many export reports, such as very general statistics that make no mention
of small arms and that are not standardized. It has shortcomings of its own.29 First, customs codes were obviously not
designed with a definition of small arms and light weapons in mind, and some codes include both small and other
(larger) arms (for example, the code 9301 includes both military small arms and items such as torpedo tubes and large
mortars). Other small arms and light weapons, such as MANPADS, are not included in any category. However, most
categories of firearms and ammunition are comparatively well covered by the customs codes (Marsh, 2003). Second,
not all state-to-state transfers go through customs, which of course affects total numbers. Third, exporters and cus-
toms officials do not always interpret customs codes in the same way. For example, for the customs code ‘pistols and
revolvers’, Brazil consistently reports ‘nil’, although import data from other countries suggests that it exports large
quantities. The handguns must therefore be (mis-)classified under some other heading (Lessing, 2003). Notwithstanding
such problems, customs data is probably the most important tool for arriving at a general picture of the small arms
trade. This is why, in a departure from previous Small Arms Survey practice, this form of transparency, and not only
export reports, is included in the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer.
The barometer is thus based on (a) export reports and (b) international customs data. The full, disaggregated table
is found in Annex 4.4, available on the Small Arms Survey web site. It is important to note that, because of its focus
on small arms exports, the barometer cannot be used as a general measure of arms export transparency. It includes
only those countries that are significant exporters of small arms and light weapons (see Table 4.1), and so excludes
some rather transparent countries, such as, for example, Denmark and the Netherlands. This also necessarily means
that the focus is mainly (although not only) on Western and Eastern European as well as North American states, given
that it is mostly among their ranks that significant exporters are found. As is shown in the barometer, the most trans-
parent among the main exporting countries are those states that both publish export reports and report their customs
data internationally. Top of the list are the United States, Germany, and France. The average score (out of 20) is 8.5.
This rather low average means that states generally, and even those countries ranking at the top of the barometer,
still have some way to go before their reporting is fully transparent.30
The rather low 
average (8.5 out 
of 20) on the 
Small Arms Trade 
Transparency
Barometer means
that states still
have some way to
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Table 4.5 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, covering known or estimated top exporters, based on 
the latest export report made publicly available and on 2001 international customs data (UN Comtrade) 31
Country and Total points Access b Clarity c Compre- Information on Information on Information on      
source(s) (20 points (2 points (4 points hensiveness d deliveries licences granted licences refused 
available max) max) max) (4 points (disaggregated by (disaggregated by (disaggregated    
(E = export Updated scores max) weapons type, and weapons type, and by weapons type,     
report, are followed by country and by country and and by country and    
C = customs by previous weapons type) weapons type) weapons type) 
data) Barometer Value of deliveries Value of licenses Value of licences (V)    
scores in (V) Quantity of (V) Quantity of Quantity of weapons   
parentheses a weapons (Q) weapons (Q) (Q) (2 points max)  
(4 points max) (4 points max)
Germany E C 15.5 (13.5) 2 3 4 2 4 0.5
United States E C 14 2 3 3 2 4 0
UK E C 13.5 (13) 2 3.5 4 4 0 0
France E C 13 2 3.5 3.5 4 0 0
Italy E C 12 2 3 3 2 2 0
Czech Rep. E C 11.5 2 2.5 4 3 0 0
Canada E C 10.5 2 3 3.5 2 0 0
Norway E C 10.5 (9) 2 3 3.5 2 0 0
Spain E C 10.5 2 3 3.5 2 0 0
Finland E C 10 2 3 3 2 0 0
Belgium E C 9.5 2 2.5 3 2 0 0
Sweden E C 9.5 (8.5) 2 2 3.5 2 0 0
Switzerland E C 9 (8.5) 2 2.5 2 2 0 0.5
Australia E C 8.5 2 2 2.5 2 0 0
Portugal E C 7.5 2 2 1.5 2 0 0
Turkey C 7.5 1.5 2 2 2 0 0
Romania E 7 2 1.5 2.5 1 0 0
Austria C 6.5 1.5 2 1 2 0 0
Brazil C 6.5 1.5 2 1 2 0 0
Japan C 6.5 1.5 2 1 2 0 0
Russian 
Federation C 6.5 1.5 2 1 2 0 0
South Korea C 6.5 1.5 2 2 1 0 0
China C 6 1.5 2 0.5 2 0 0
Mexico C 6 1.5 2 0.5 2 0 0
Israel C 5.5 1.5 2 0 2 0 0
South Africa E 5 (5.5) 2 1 0 2 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sources: UN Comtrade, download date 31 Oct 2003, Australia (2003), Belgium (2003), Canada (2002), Czech Republic (2003), Finland (2002), 
France (2003), Germany (2002, 2003), Italy (2003), Norway (2003, 2004), Portugal (2002), Romania (2002, 2003), South Africa (2002), 
Spain (2003, 2004), Sweden (2003), Switzerland (2003, 2004), UK (2003, 2004), United States Department of State (2003)
Notes: Includes the following parameters:
(a) Total points: Updates reflect information contained in arms export reports made available since December 2003.
(b) Access: Information is: available on Internet (half point); available in a UN language (1 point); free of charge (half point).
(c) Clarity: The reporting includes methodology (1 point); small arms and light weapons distinguishable from other types of weapons (1 point); 
SALW ammunition distinguishable from other types of ammunition (1 point); reporting includes information on end-user categories (military; police; oth-
er security forces; civilians directly; civilian retailers) (1 point).
(d) Comprehensiveness: The reporting covers: government as well as industry-negotiated transactions (1 point); civilian as well as military SALW 
(1 point); information on SALW parts (1 point); summaries of export laws and regulations as well as international commitments (1 point).
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EXPORTING SMALL ARMS: A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL FOR PRODUCERS?
As many analysts have noted, arms production has been transformed in recent decades. It is no longer an industry
catering largely to internal needs and exporting selectively (based on political considerations), but a for-profit, export-
oriented industry like many others (Naylor, 1998). More wide-ranging exports are thought essential to maintaining a
technological edge and economic viability. To what extent is this true for military (as well as non-military) small arms
Box 4.3 Transparency developing in leaps: Romanian arms export reporting
For the countries that entered the European Union on 1 May 2004,32 export reports are few and far
between, although some are quite generous in sharing their customs data.
In fact, to date, one of the most ambitious countries in this respect seems to be Romania, which
is not scheduled to become a member of the Union until 2007 at the earliest. The Romanian export
report was published for the first time in mid-2002 and is available in English online (Romania,
2002). Challenges facing the author are very frankly noted in the foreword to the report. In
particular, there was a Ôgenuine ÒconfrontationÓ between the necessity of transparency and the
conservative approach of some senior Romanian expertsÕ (Romania, 2002, p. iv).
The report covers both private and public sector exports. It lists the numbers of companies
authorized to trade in various categories of weapons. The information provided on export
licences is rather sparse. While total numbers of licence applications, denials, and approvals are
noted andÑunlike in most other export reportsÑvalues for all three categories are given, they are
broken down only by region, not by country or weapon type. The part on licensing also quantifies
permits issued for non-commercial operations. ML1, ML2, and ML3 are said to be among the main
categories of these operations.
In fact, the report uses the weapons categories of the Wassenaar Arrangement. There, the first
category, ML1, covers Ôarms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and acces-
soriesÉ and specially designed components thereforeÕ; and the second, ML2, Ôarmament or
weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, projectors and accessoriesÉ and specially designed
components thereforeÕ. ML3 encompasses Ôammunition and specially designed components
therefore, for the weapons controlled by ML1, ML2, or ML12Õ. In principle, ML1 is the only pure SALW
category, with ML2 and ML3 containing important elements of non-SALW. However, the report states that Ôin the structure of
Romanian arms exports, the small calibre arms (ML1) represent the most important segment, [together with] light weapons
(ML2) and the related munitions (ML3)Õ (Romania, 2002, p.35). This seems to indicate that, in the Romanian case, ML1, ML2, and
ML3 contain only, or primarily, SALW.
The report notes that in 2000 ML1 and ML2 (presented together) accounted for 34 per cent of actual exports, whereas ML3
covered 36 per cent. Based on total arms exports (USD 37.8 million according to the report), ML1 and ML2 accounted for USD
12.85 million, and ML3 USD 13.61 million. Totals for 2001 were:  ML1 and ML2 55 per cent, and ML3 only 8 per cent, which gives
values of USD 13.48 million and USD 1.96 million (total exports were USD 24.5 million). The report does not detail shipments
by country.
Although far from perfectly transparent, the report provides more SALW-relevant information than, say, the Australian or the
Portuguese reports (Romania obtains a lower ranking on the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer than these two
countries because it does not report customs data internationally).
Overall, the report is a positive example of an emerging export transparency measure, and significant efforts have been
devoted to its preparation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the practice is sustained over time. The Czech
Republic published a special report on small arms exports in 2001, in time for the UN Small Arms Conference (see Small Arms
Survey, 2002, p. 118), and has continued reporting since. Without sufficient political will, the same might not be true for Romania.
Source: Kytmki (2003)
RomaniaÕs first report 
on arms exports.
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and light weapons production? Does the fact that the US is the top exporter (see previous section) mean that its small
arms industry is dependent on exports for its long-term viability? To answer questions such as these, exporting has
to be seen in the context of production.
The top small arms producing countries have been listed in previous editions of the Small Arms Survey. Focusing
on two of the three major producers (Russia and the US) as well as a few medium producers (Germany and Brazil),
this section shows that the degree of export dependency varies among producing countries and firms.
US: limited dependence, but for military weapons 33
In general, US small arms manufacturers are not very dependent on exports for their revenue—manufacturers export
on average only about 5–6 per cent of total small arms production, according to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) data (see Table 4.6).34 Using customs data slightly increases this share, to 9.7 per cent of all
small arms produced in 2001. However, there are problems with using data from two different sources, as methodologies
differ. Whatever the sources used, the export dependency of the US small arms industry is less than 10 per cent.
However, when one looks at specific years, companies, or types of weapons, the picture seems slightly different.
In fact, there are significant variations in export dependency among companies. In 2001, the latest year for which data
is available, pistol producer Davis Industries exported 100 per cent of its production, while a large producer of pistols
such as Bryco Arms did not export any arms. Among the most important producers, Smith and Wesson was by far
the most export dependent in 2001, exporting 15.5 per cent of pistols and 28.6 per cent of revolvers produced. Its
competitor Sturm Ruger & Co, in contrast, exported between 1.5 per cent (pistols) and 3.8 per cent (rifles) of its total
production in 2001 (for more details, see Annex 4.2 available on the Small Arms Survey Web site).
In addition, certain types of small arms are exported to a larger extent than others. This is outlined in Figure 4.1
below. Machine guns, short-barreled rifles and shotguns, and ‘miscellaneous firearms’ (generally muzzle loading) are
exported to a much higher degree than other types of small arms (pistols, revolvers, rifles, and shotguns), although
data varies from year to year (exact percentages are presented in Annex 4.3 available on the Small Arms Survey
Web site).
A close look at the data in Table 4.6 above reveals that US production and export levels have gone very largely
hand in hand. Hence, in 1998, when 3.7 million weapons were produced, 0.22 million (5.8 per cent) were exported.
Three years later, in 2001, production had decreased substantially, to 3.0 million weapons. Export numbers followed
suit, to 0.18 million. The percentage share has remained more or less constant, at 6.1 per cent SALW exported in 2001
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Table 4.6 Total quantity of firearms produced and exported by US manufacturers, 1998—2001
Year Quantity produced Quantity exported % exported
1998 3,724,546 215,873 5.8
1999 4,070,237 242,573 6.0
2000 3,840,941 184,346 4.8
2001 2,989,022 182,632 6.1
Total 1998—2001 14,624,746 825,424                          Average: 5.6
Source: US, ATF (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001)
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(the average for 1998–2001 is 5.6). Declines in recent years in US exports of both military and civilian small arms
should therefore be interpreted in the context of declining total domestic production: declining exports in absolute
numbers do not necessarily signify that the US is becoming less dependent on export markets.
Figure 4.1 Export dependence of US small arms manufacturers, by type of weapon, 1998—2001
Although not particularly dependent on exports generally, US exporters tend to rely on a few markets only: of
the 115,950 sporting shotguns and combination shotgun-rifles exported in 2002, 32 per cent were imported by the
United Kingdom, 15 per cent by Spain, and 9 per cent by Canada; these top three importers thus accounted for 56
per cent of the US exports of these weapons (US, Department of Commerce, 2003). The United Kingdom was also
the top importer of military shotguns, with 36 per cent of the market, followed by New Zealand with 23 per cent. As
for military rifles, the US exported 73 per cent of these to Middle Eastern countries in 2002. Kuwait was the major
destination with 35 per cent, followed by Israel with 21 per cent. Another significant importer was Nepal (10 per cent).
The top destination of US machine guns was South Korea, which imported 48 per cent of the 21,465 total machine
guns that were exported by the US in 2002. After South Korea come Colombia (23 per cent) and Malaysia (18 per
cent) (US, Department of Commerce, 2003). US exports of pistols and revolvers (73,262 weapons exported in 2002)
are less concentrated; however, the top five importers account for 50 per cent of the US export market. Belgium is at
the top with 19 per cent, followed by Japan (12 per cent), Germany (8 per cent), Thailand (6 per cent), and Venezuela
(5 per cent). As for hunting and sporting rifles of a value less than USD 50 each, the United Kingdom is the largest
importer, importing 63 per cent of the 17,721 such weapons exported by the US in 2002. For hunting and sporting
rifles valued at over USD 50, Canada is the top importer with 34 per cent of the 72,025 rifles exported globally (US,
Department of Commerce, 2003).
As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, there are caveats to this data. It is not always clear when arms pass
through customs whether they have actually arrived at their final destination. In some cases, weapons are sent back
to the manufacturer for repair or refurbishing, and returned once the repairs are completed. This may explain why


100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
1998 1999 2000
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 e
xp
or
te
d
2001
Pistols
Revolvers
Rifles
Shotguns
Machine Guns
Short-barreled rifles
and shotguns
Misc. Firearms
Source: US, ATF (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001)
chapter 4-04  5.7.2004  9:49  Page 120
Belgium has a high rate of imports, as it is a major exporter of handguns to the US. Also, sometimes weapons passing
through customs may be used by military troops deployed abroad. It is possible that some of the weapons being sent
to the Middle East are assigned to the US troops presently stationed there. Finally, the US and Canada jointly manu-
facture some types of small arms, and some of the US–Canada trade that appears in customs data could consist of
weapons that are crossing the border to be finished in Canada.
Although US exports depend on single destinations, top customers seem to change over time. Table 4.7 shows
sharp declines in exports of pistols and revolvers to Thailand and the Philippines since 1995. Similarly, the two coun-
tries made large purchases of military rifles in the late 1990s and, since then, imports have decreased dramatically.
While Israel had seen a steady decline in imports of military rifles from the US over the past few years, 2002 goes
against this trend.
Russia: important export share 35
Since the early 1990s, Russian small arms manufacturers have substantially restructured their production (PRODUCERS).
From the late 1980s and up until the last couple of years, the Russian armed forces basically did not acquire any new
arms, and government orders for ammunition plummeted (Pyadushkin, 2003). At the same time, current Russian legal
regulations make legal, large-scale sales of small arms to ordinary Russians impossible (Pyadushkin, 2003). Hence today
most Russian small arms producing companies are not operating at their full capacity, and the serial production of
military small arms has virtually stopped (Pyadushkin, 2003, p. 3). Moreover, companies have increasingly turned to
production of cars, machine tools, instruments, and other purely civilian products.
All these problems with the internal market notwithstanding, Russia remains a top producer of small arms
and light weapons, thanks in no small part to a successful turn to exporting them. Current knowledge about the
Russian small arms industry suggests that approximately half of production is exported (Table 4.8; the main recipi-
ents are listed in Table 4.1). However, information is scarce about the two state-owned companies, KBP and Kolomna
MBDB.
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Table 4.7 Emerging and declining customers for US exports (quantity of weapons exported), 1995—2003
Year Thailand (pistols Thailand Philippines Philippines Israel (military Nepal (military
and revolvers) (military rifles) (pistols and (military rifles) rifles) rifles) 
revolvers)
1995 43,595 0 17,407 0 740 0
1996 20,362 510 18,860 0 62,277 0
1997 7,066 685 9,640 6,054 32,625 4,000
1998 7,962 10,100 2,817 20,256 40,350 0
1999 7,330 19,428 5,410 924 10,055 0
2000 6,003 16,645 50 0 2,843 0
2001 6,553 1 1,046 328 3,442 0
2002 4,230 0 1,883 76 6,375 3,000
2003* 1,437 102 788 184 40 3,400
* January—July
Source: US ATF, various years
chapter 4-04  5.7.2004  9:49  Page 121
122
SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004
Interestingly, Russian small arms producers are less export-dependent than previously thought (Pyadushkin, 2003).
Hunting and sporting rifles are finding domestic customers. For example, according to the (imperfect) figures currently avail-
able, 70 per cent of IMZ’s civilian weapons are sold to Russian amateur hunters, most probably in the larger cities. The
Izhevsk Arms Factory exported 24 per cent of its production of civilian firearms in 2002; the rest were sold domestically. The
largest foreign customer was the US, which received about 23 per cent of the exports. Combat small arms also seem to have
found domestic customers recently (in the form of the Russian Ministry of Defence).  While Izhevsk Arms Factory exported
71.3 per cent of its production of combat small arms in 2000, and 88.3 per cent in 2001, the figure had fallen to 26.5 per cent
in 2002. However, it is probably too early to speak of a trend towards production for domestic army consumption.
Some other large producers: the importance of being an exporter
As discussed in further detail elsewhere in this volume (PRODUCERS), Brazil 36 is the largest producer of small arms and light
weapons (including ammunition) in Latin America, and its output is the most diversified in the entire hemisphere after the
US. It is heavily dependent on exports. According to Brazilian government statistics for 2001, the total sales of nationally pro-
duced non-military firearms (including ammunition and parts) amounted to approximately USD 100.3 million (IBGE, 2002).37
Total exports for the same year were USD 62.5 million, or 62.3 per cent of total sales.38 The actual export share may be
Interestingly,
Russian small arms
producers are less
export-dependent
than was previously
thought.
Table 4.8 Exports of civilian and combat SALW from Russia in 2002, by manufacturer
Company (products) SALW sales/production Export volume, Exports as % of total  
volume, USD m USD m sales/production
Izhevsk Arms Factory (Izhmash) (automatic sniper rifles, 
hunting and sporting shotguns and rifles) 13.1 3.2 24
IMZ (hunting and sporting shotguns) 52 15.7 30.2
TOZ (handguns, automatic and sniper rifles, anti-tank guided 
missiles, hunting and sporting shotguns and rifles) 29.2* 1.2** 4 (most likely an underestimate)
Kovrov Mechanical Plant (machine guns, 
grenade launchers, ATGMs) 2.5 No data available 
V.A. Degtyaryov Plant (MANPADS, machine guns) 108.5 86.8*** 80
Molot (ATGM, hunting weapons) 16.4 1.2 7.3
Total 221.7 108.1
Note: As more detailed information is currently unavailable, export volumes may include other products besides SALW.
* Total sales, including combat and civilian SALW as well as civilian goods.
** Only civilian firearms.
*** Calculated on the basis of the correlation between different types of production in 2001. Military production: 50% of total, 80% of military produc-
tion is exported. See Interfax (2003).
Source: CAST (2003)
Table 4.9 Combat small arms export by Izhevsk Arms Factory, 2000—02
Year 2000 2001 2002
Value of exports (in USD millions) 3.4 1.7 0.85
% of total combat small arms production 71.3 88.3 26.5
Note: Calculated on the basis of the correlation between different types of production in 2001. Military production: 50 per cent of total, 80 per cent 
of military production is exported. See Interfax (2003).
Source: CAST (2003)
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even higher, given that the publicly available trade statistics do not include state-to-state transfers. Not all Brazilian compa-
nies are equally dependent on exports. For example, while for Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC, producing ammu-
nition, shotguns, and rifles) exports amounted to approximately 34 per cent of total sales in 2002, Taurus, Brazil’s largest
exporter of guns and a major supplier of handguns to the United States, reported exports of USD 38.1 million in 2002,
totalling 74 per cent of its sales. For Amadeo Rossi, a small producer (of shotguns and rifles), the share was 77 per cent.39
Brazil is heavily dependent on exports to one market: the US. In 2000 and 2001, exports to the US accounted for 54
per cent (USD 37.6 million) and 59 per cent (USD 37 million) of total small arms exports, respectively.40 In 2002, exports
to the US increased to USD 55.7 million. Presumably, this is not because the US was more important for Brazilian exporters
but because of an overall increase in exports as a consequence of the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, the real. Other
significant recipients of Brazilian weapons in the last years have been Algeria, Colombia, and Germany (see Table 4.10).
By comparison, Argentina, the only other Latin American producer and exporter of any significance (close to USD
6 million in exports in 2001 and 7 million in 2002), is equally dependent on exports to the United States for its sur-
vival. The two main privately owned small arms producing companies, Bersa S.A. and Lasserre S.A. (also known as
Rexio), are highly dependent on exports of their products (mainly pistols). Bersa, for example, exported 70 per cent
of its production in 2002, and the United States overshadows all other recipients by far.41
Germany is one of the biggest European producers of small arms, and also one of the largest exporters. Its export
share is even more impressive than that of Brazil: 92 per cent of all pistols and revolvers produced were exported in
2001; in 2002, 86 per cent of weapons in this category were sold abroad (see Table 4.12). For hunting and sporting
rifles, export appear to be equally important for the industry.
German imports of pistols and revolvers are rather limited. In 2001, a little more than 35,000 pistols and revolvers
were imported into Germany; in 2002, the figure was approximately 37,000. This means that, even if Germany put
restrictions on imports, German companies could not continue producing at current levels. In contrast, import and
export of hunting and sporting weapons reach similar levels. For hunting and sporting rifles, the import figures were
a little more than 68,000 in 2001 and over 60,000 in 2002.
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Table 4.10 Brazilian SALW-related commercial exports, top ten recipients, 1998—2002, in USD
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
US 27,621,389 US 36,258,797 US 37,645,729 US 36,959,632 US 42 55,687,807
Belgium 3,380,755 Germany 2,677,782
United Arab 
7,245,303 Colombia 3,858,170 Colombia 5,911,905
Emirates
Argentina 3,128,677 Argentina 2,622,543 Argentina 2,662,638 Algeria 2,781,100 Germany 2,489,520
Peru 2,816,820 Peru 1,773,674 Venezuela 2,165,468 Germany 2,312,778 Algeria 2,486,360
Venezuela 2,611,164 Chile 1,397,566 Germany 2,077,718 Argentina 2,123,972 Singapore 2,107,306
Saudi Arabia 2,153,441 Angola 1,321,800 Angola 2,001,841 Belgium 1,864,062 Belgium 1,889,635
Germany 2,147,762 Philippines 977,809 Peru 1,919,267
United Arab 
1,341,302 Pakistan 1,873,940
Emirates
Colombia 2,128,483 Norway 889,069 Colombia 1,493,883 Yemen 1,096,240 Botswana 1,832,855
Paraguay 2,085,896 Paraguay 857,460 Chile 1,116,986 Angola 887,000 UK 1,758,934
South Africa 1,651,543 South Africa 704,627 New Zealand 1,010,384 Malaysia 816,312 Argentina 1,067,541
Source: SECEX (Secretaria de Comrcio Exterior) database
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Box 4.4 European export dependency on US civilian markets
The American market for firearms is the largest in the world, and has been growing in recent years, from 754,102 firearms (hand-
guns, rifles, and shotguns) in fiscal year 1980 and 843,809 in 1990, to 1,096,782 in 2000 and 1,957,563 in 2002. All categories of
firearms imports have grown, most spectacularly imports of handguns (International Firearms Trade, 2003, pp. 2, 10).
An important share of these imports comes from the member states of the European Union (see also Table 4.3 above). For
example, out of the roughly 950,000 handguns imported in 2002, some 470,000Ñor 50 per centÑcame from the EU (US,
Department of Commerce, 2003). Ironically, given a tendency of Europeans to disapprove of the permissive US gun policies and
gun culture,43 many European companies would in all likelihood have some difficulty surviving without the US civilian market.
Table 4.11 shows that around half of all EU exports of handguns, rifles, and shotguns are destined for the US. While some of
theseÑhandguns in particularÑundoubtedly go to US law enforcement agencies and armed forces, many probably go to the US
civilian market. Of the top five EU exporters of firearms (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain), Austria is the most dependent
on US markets (72 per cent of Austrian handguns, rifles, and shotguns go to the US). Italy comes second, with just over half of its
total exports of these three categories of weapons going to the US. Belgium is least dependent on US markets, with only 19 per
cent of weapons in the three categories exported to the US.
What is missing from this picture is, of course, total production (rather than exports) of handguns, rifles, and shotguns within
the EU countries. Such figures would make it possible to determine the overall dependence of producers on exports to the US.
Information on Germany presented above suggests that dependency on exports is high, but similar data is not readily available
for other European countries. Also missing is the overseas production of European firms such as Heckler & Koch, and Beretta.
Table 4.11 Percentage of EU exports of non-military small arms (by value) destined for the US, 2001, 
ranked by total share of exports (three categories) going to the US
EU country Pistols Shotguns Hunting rifles All three weapons categories 
Austria 78 21 6 72
United Kingdom 2 * 71 63 65
Italy 40 60 35 56
Sweden 65 * 29 * 32 * 41
Spain 68 34 44 41
Finland 4 * 0 * 43 40
Greece 0 * 44 * 0* 38*
Germany 44 25 16 34
Portugal 53 2 43 30
Netherlands 0 * 90 * 24 * 26*
Belgium 59 4 34 19
Denmark 90 * 0 * 1 * 14
France 12 * 2 4 4
Ireland 0 * 0 * 0 * 0*
Luxemburg 0 * No exports in this category 0 * 0 *
Total 58 48 31 48
Note: * Total sales in this category amount to less than USD 1 million.
Source: NISAT 2003
chapter 4-04  5.7.2004  9:49  Page 124
SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION
A number of regional and multilateral agreements explicitly cite human rights44 as a criterion when deciding whether
to authorize arms exports. Although most of these, including the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
(EU, 1998), the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers (OSCE 1993), the OSCE Document on Small
Arms and Light Weapons (OSCE, 2000), and the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small
Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (2002) are not legally binding, they are starting to generate legally binding com-
mitments. For example, the rules included in the EU Code of Conduct have been integrated into Belgian law, so as
to render it compulsory in Belgium (Belgium, 2003, p. 2).45
Some national legislation and regulations contain human rights criteria, such as for example the ‘Leahy Law’ in the
United States and the Swedish guidelines for arms exports. Far from all do, however. Moreover, states interpret human
rights criteria differently. A now almost classic example is the Belgian decision in 2002 to grant a licence for exports to
Nepal, which had earlier been denied by Germany. The Belgian foreign minister found the sale ‘eminently ethical’ as it
would help a weakened democracy fight terrorism (BICC, 2003, Box U.18). 
International lawyers and activists argue that states are bound by existing international human rights law when decid-
ing upon a transfer. A transferring state incurs derivative responsibility for violations of international law committed by the
recipient, given that the transferring state is aware of the situation in the recipient state (see Gillard, 2000, and Small Arms
Survey, 2003, pp. 224–5 for further details).
More specifically, there are at least two ways in which the human rights criterion can be interpreted with respect
to transfers, which is illustrated in several of the above-mentioned documents. For example, the second criterion of
the EU Code of Conduct states in its first paragraph that EU states will ‘not issue an export licence if there is a clear
risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression’.46 In the second paragraph, it is established that
EU member states will ‘exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking
account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established
by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe, or by the EU’ (EU, 1998). The main principle is thus not
to deliver materiel which forseeably could be used in human rights violations. However, the language also points to a
second principle governing exports to human rights abusers, namely, that all weapons exports to perpetrators of grave
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Table 4.12 German production and exports of selected civilian weapons, 2001—02 (numbers of weapons)
2001 2002
Production Export % exported Production Export % exported
Pistols and
revolvers 159,571 147,379 92 197,688 169,029 86 
Hunting and 
sporting rifles 48,400* 43,751 90 52,300* 50,264 96
* Production volumes of one category of hunting and sporting weapons (out of four), Ôother hunting and sporting gunsÕ, has been estimated from 
production values.
Source: Production figures from Statistisches Bundesamt (2003), trade figures from Verband der Hersteller von Jagd-, Sportwaffen und Munition, 
private communication (compiled from Statistisches Bundesamt)
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violations of human rights are to be conducted with a high degree of caution. These two criteria implicitly or explicitly
underlie much of the general debate on weapons transfers and human rights violations.
In what follows, examples will be given of exports of small arms to those countries in which some of the world’s
most serious human rights violations have occurred; it will also examine the use of specific imported firearms in
human rights violations.
Tracing weapons from provider to perpetrator: good progress
A number of attempts to trace the use of specific imported small arms in human rights abuses have been made.
Recently, Jürgen Grässlin (2003) has traced in detail the role of German Heckler & Koch G-3 guns in the individual
destinies of a woman in Somaliland and a Kurdish man in Turkey, destinies marked by human rights violations.
Amnesty International has highlighted a range of cases in which human rights have been violated with imported
arms. One of the first cases reported concerned Finnish bullets used in East Timor. Following an attack by a para-
military militia in the capital of East Timor, Dili, on 17 April 1999, Amnesty researchers collected the casings of bullets
reportedly fired by the militia at the scene. Amnesty later found that the casings had been manufactured in Finland
by Patria Lapua Oy. The story created a considerable stir in Finland (Amnesty International, 1999). Amnesty has since
continued its work with tracing weapons used in human rights violations. It traced munitions used in the fighting
between Ugandan and Rwandese forces over Kisangani in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in 2000, in
which many civilians died. Amnesty researchers collected, amongst other things, North Korean and Russian 14.5mm
cartridges (for heavy machine guns), Chinese 12.7mm cartridges (also for heavy machine guns), Russian cartridges for
Nagant revolvers, South African (Armscor) 7.62mm ammunition (possible date 1981), and a Chinese (Norinco) cartridge
from 37mm ammunition for type 55 anti-aircraft weapon (Amnesty International, 2002; Amnesty International and
Oxfam, 2003, p. 10). Similar cases have involved Austrian Glock pistols in East Timor and 9mm Browning handguns
in Jamaica (Amnesty International, 2003c, 2003d).
Carrying her baby, an East Timorese woman points to exhibition photos of human rights violations committed by Indonesian forces in East Timor.
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Human Rights Watch has also documented the origin of weapons used in human rights violations in both
conflict and non-conflict situations. In an incident of excessive use of police force in Zambia in 1997, the organiza-
tion traced the bullet used to seriously injure opposition leader Rodger Chongwe back to the manufacturing country,
the former Yugoslavia. The bullet had reportedly been fired without prior warning and as the opposition leader was
leaving a peaceful rally that the police had disrupted (HRW, 1998a, pp. 12–13). In a more recent case, the organiza-
tion traced the origin of remnants of mortar rounds found in Monrovia, Liberia, after the indiscriminate killing of civil-
ians by rebels during the 2003 fighting. It found that the mortar rounds (81mm and 60mm, produced in 2001 and
2002) had been purchased by Guinea (which at the time had a seat on the UN Security Council) from Iran earlier the
same year and transferred to Liberia, which was under a UN embargo (HRW, 2003). Other cases have involved, for
example, detailing the arms inventories of Sudanese government forces (in its 1998 report, Human Rights Watch
found that the small arms came from a large number of states, including China, France, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Russia,
South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the former Yugoslavia) (HRW, 1998b), and the ammunition used in
extrajudicial executions in Kosovo in 1998.
Similarly, in an investigative newspaper report, Paul Salopek of the Chicago Tribune first described the harsh living
conditions of a Romanian employee of a Kalashnikov factory. He then went on to outline the activities of Grace Ikombi,
a Congolese rebel who is responsible for human rights violations and owns one of the Romanian guns, an AKM-47,
serial number DA0889 1995 (Salopek, 2001, p. 1).
To date, such efforts,47 however revealing, have involved varying investigative techniques and standards of evidence.
They have not yet led to a systematic understanding of which weapons (from which countries and companies) are used
in human rights violations worldwide, although progress has clearly been made. The United Nations Special Rapporteur
on small arms and human rights, Barbara Frey, has called upon investigators of human rights abuse to identify the tools
by which such abuses are committed (Frey, 2002, para. 31–4). The human rights community seems to be heeding this
call: more and more reports of the kind described above have appeared in the last years.
Small arms transfers to states where gross violations of human rights occur
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Peace Information Service, NISAT, and the various UN
expert panel investigations on violations of UN arms embargoes have for some years published detailed information on
arms transfers to states where gross human rights violations occur. This also follows the logic of some exporters, which,
as noted above, vow to restrict exports to countries with poor human rights records.  
Table 4.14 focuses on the most serious cases of human rights violations only, as measured on the Political Terror
Scale (that is, those in which murders, disappearances, and torture are frequent). There are several rankings of human
rights abuses, all of which are controversial, in part because ranking human suffering in this way is a debatable enter-
prise, and some rankings are perceived to be politically biased. The Political Terror Scale, updated yearly by an
American scholar, uses Amnesty International reports and US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices as the basis for the ranking. Both sources are widely used in the human rights community. The rankings
take into account the human rights situation in the country generally, not only abuses committed by governments.
Table 4.14 lists known exports to states (and non-state actors active in those states) where serious human rights
violations are systematic. It shows that, while some of these states were fairly isolated and received weapons from a
few states only, others seem able to import small arms, ammunition, and parts fairly easily from a wide variety of
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sources. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Myanmar, and North Korea are good examples of the former, and Algeria, China,
Colombia, Indonesia, and Russia are examples of the latter. 
Only some of these states were actually under a mandatory UN embargo during the period covered (1998–2002, that
is, the most recent five-year period for which data is available), namely, Afghanistan (the Taliban) from 1999, Angola
(UNITA) 1993–2002, Ethiopia 2000–01, Iraq from 1990, Liberia from 1992, Rwanda (non-state armed groups) from 1994,
Sierra Leone (non-state armed groups) from 1997, Somalia from 1992, and the former Yugoslavia 1998–2001. Others have
been under EU embargo. China, for instance, has been under EU embargo since the suppression of the pro-democracy
movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989. It might therefore seem surprising that Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the UK have all exported small arms to China. The reason for this apparent contradiction is that the EU did
not originally define what would count as ‘arms’ under the embargo (SIPRI, no date). In December 1995, a common
interpretation was issued which restricted the embargo to ‘lethal weapons’ (France, Ministère de la Défense, 2003, p. 72).
Hence, the British explained their exports by stressing that ‘the ammunition listed is in fact sporting gun ammunition
(not covered by the UK’s interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo) and the parts and accessories of military weapons refer
to military firing sets for use in Explosive Ordnance Disposal work’ (personal communication, 12 February 2004). Similar
reasoning could lie behind the exports from Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, and Spain.
It should be noted that the discussion here is rather restrictive in its scope—only the countries with extremely
serious human rights problems have been included. A country such as Saudi Arabia, for instance, is not covered
although its record on human rights is rather bleak and it has an increasingly ambiguous image when it comes to
combating international terrorism. Saudi Arabia is the single largest customer of major EU exporters such as Belgium,
France, and Spain and on the top five recipients list of many other important producers-exporters, including the US.
In fact, Saudi Arabia is one of the top five known importers of small arms worldwide.
As always, the data should be interpreted with caution. Customs data, which is used in Table 4.14, does not tell
us the reason for export. German exports to DRC are quite likely to have been destined for the UN mission estab-
lished after the peace accord in 2001. However, all recorded customs figures have been included in the table. It is
also important to note that the table does not aim to be exhaustive. Instead, it should serve to illustrate that small
arms exports—both authorized and illicit—to states where gross human rights violations take place are still common.
Table 4.13 Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998—200248
Country Exporters, years, and USD values
Afghanistan 
(Taliban government) Pakistan,49 Saudi Arabia provided funds for weapons purchases (public funds: after US protests, private funds only).50
Afghanistan 
(Northern Alliance) India,51 Iran,52 Russia,53 US ,54 non-state supplies from Tajikistan 55
Algeria 1998: China (3.0m mainly hunting rifles), France (14,000 mainly shotguns), Italy (0.5m mainly handguns),   
Russia (3.5m shotguns), UK (0.2m ammunition)
1999: France (18,000 mainly shotguns), Italy (0.5m mainly handguns), Russia (6.4m mainly shotguns and parts  
and accessories), South Africa 11.1m military weapons, Switzerland (28,000 handguns and parts and accessories)
2000: France (29,000 mainly shotguns), Russia (0.6m mainly ammunition), UK (24,000 ammunition)
2001: Brazil (2.8m ammunition), France (0.1m mainly shotguns), Italy (0.3m mainly handguns and shotguns),  
Russia (3.5m mainly shotguns)
2002: Brazil (2.5m ammunition), France (0.9m mainly shotguns), Italy (USD 1.5m mainly handguns)
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Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998—2002
Country Exporters, years, and USD values
Angola 1998: Portugal (71,000 mainly shotguns)
1999: Brazil (1.3m mainly shotgun cartridges), Portugal (16,000 mainly shotguns), Slovakia (0.5m mainly 
military weapons), South Africa (11,000 mainly military weapons)
2000: Brazil (2m mainly shotgun cartridges), Portugal (50,000 mainly shotguns), Russia (2.4m ammunition), 
Slovakia (29,000 pistols and revolvers)
2001: Brazil (0.9m shotgun cartridges), Namibia (16,000 mainly ammunition and hunting rifles),  
Poland (0.6m military weapons), Portugal (42,000 mainly pistols and revolvers)
2002: Portugal (74,000 mainly shotgun cartridges, pistols and revolvers, and shotguns), Spain (49,000 ammunition),
France,56 Russia 57
Angola (UNITA) In the late 1990s, illicit supplies originating in Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine were supplied to UNITA. Chinese 
and Russian weapons have also been found in UNITA stockpiles.58
Burundi 2000: Poland (1.0m ammunition)
China 1998: Austria (26,000 mainly hunting rifles), Belarus (0.2m parts and accessories of military weapons), 
Canada (0.1m ammunition), Germany (0.2m mainly hunting rifles and ammunition), Hong Kong (11,000 pistols 
and revolvers), Italy (99,000 mainly shotguns), Mexico (64,000 ammunition), Spain (56,000 shotguns), 
Switzerland (61,000 mainly ammunition and shotguns), US (60,000 mainly shotgun cartridges)
1999: Canada (0.1m ammunition), Finland (17,000 ammunition), Germany (0.3m mainly hunting rifles and ammunition),
Hong Kong (28,000 mainly military weapons), Italy (71,500 mainly shotgun cartridges), Mexico (11,000 parts and 
accessories of military weapons), Russia (8.0m ammunition and parts and accessories for military weapons), 
South Africa (10,000 ammunition), Switzerland (0.2m parts and accessories of military weapons), 
UK (0.2m ammunition), US (0.1m mainly shotgun cartridges)
2000: Canada (52,000 ammunition), Finland (0.1m ammunition), Germany (0.2m mainly hunting rifles), 
Hong Kong (26,500 mainly shotguns), Italy (0.1m mainly pistols and revolvers, and shotgun cartridges), 
Russia (9.0m mainly ammunition), Switzerland (1.8m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), 
UK (0.45m ammunition), US (23,000 ammunition)
2001: Australia (11,000 pistols and revolvers), Canada (94,000 ammunition), Finland (76,000 ammunition), 
Germany (0.3m mainly ammunition and rifles), Italy (57,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), Serbia and Montenegro
(0.6m parts and accessories of military weapons), Singapore (0.6m parts and accessories of military 
weapons), Switzerland (4.0m mainly pistols and revolvers), UK (0.4m ammunition), US (0.2m mainly ammunition)
2002: Australia (0.1m mainly shotguns), Austria (24,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), 
Canada (57,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Germany (0.5m mainly sporting and hunting rifles),
Hong Kong (58,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), Italy (0.35m mainly shotguns), Russia (44,000 parts and accessories
of military weapons), South Korea (29,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), Spain (18,000 ammunition), 
Switzerland (0.9m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), UK (1.0m parts and accessories of military 
weapons, and ammunition), US (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons)
Colombia 1998: Austria (0.3m pistols and revolvers), Belgium-Luxemburg (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns and 
rifles), Brazil (3.0m mainly shotgun cartridges), Bulgaria (1.9m military weapons), Croatia (1.2m military weapons), 
Czech Republic (0.5m mainly pistols and revolvers), France (78,000 mainly parts and accessories of military 
weapons), Germany (14,000 mainly ammunition and shotguns), Israel (6,3m mainly parts and accessories for military 
weapons), Italy (1,2m mainly pistols and revolvers), Portugal (0.1m parts and accessories for military weapons), 
South Africa (3,3m mainly military weapons), Spain (75,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons),  
UK (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), US (24.0m mainly military weapons),
1999: Austria (0.4m mainly pistols and revolvers), Brazil (1.0m mainly shogun cartridges and ammunition), 
Croatia (1.0m military weapons), Czech Republic (0.4m mainly pistols and revolvers), Germany (0.1m mainly pistols 
and revolvers), Israel (3.6m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Italy (3.8m mainly parts and 
accessories for military weapons), Singapore (12,000 military weapons), South Africa (1.0m mainly military weapons), 
Spain (0.3m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), UK (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for military 
weapons), US (9.0m mainly military weapons and ammunition).
2000: Belgium (1.5m military weapons), Brazil (1.9m mainly shotgun cartridges), Bulgaria (75,000 parts and 
accessories for military weapons), Czech Republic (0.9m mainly pistols and revolvers), Germany (0.2m mainly pistols 
and revolvers), Israel (2.8m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Italy (0.9m mainly pistols and 
revolvers), Portugal (31,000 ammunition), South Africa (0.6m mainly military weapons), Spain (38,000 mainly 
sporting and hunting rifles), UK (27,000 mainly ammunition), US (8.5m mainly ammunition and military weapons)
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Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998—2002
Country Exporters, years, and USD values
2001: Belgium (23,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Brazil (4.4m mainly shotgun cartridges), 
Czech Republic (0.9m mainly pistols and revolvers), Germany (0.2m pistols and revolvers), Israel (3.3m mainly parts 
and accessories for military weapons), Italy (1.3m mainly pistols and revolvers), Portugal (49,000 ammunition), 
South Africa (1.3m mainly military weapons), Spain (0.2m mainly shotguns), UK (0.1m mainly ammunition), 
US (16.0m mainly military weapons).
2002: Argentina (40,000 pistols and revolvers), Brazil (6.4m mainly shotgun cartridges), Czech Republic (1.3m mainly
pistols and revolvers), Germany (0.4m pistols and revolvers), Israel (5.9m mainly military weapons and parts and 
accessories for military weapons), Italy (0.4m mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and shotgun cartridges), Pakistan
(13,000 military weapons), Portugal (26,000 ammunition), Russia (37,500 sporting and hunting rifles), South Africa 
(2.7m mainly military weapons), Spain (60,500 military weapons), UK (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military 
weapons), US (12.1m mainly military weapons and parts and accessories for military weapons) 
Colombia AUC: Illicit supplies originating in Nicaragua,59 Panama 60
(AUC, ELN, FARC) FARC, ELN: Illict supplies originating in Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela.61 IRA was allegedly supplying weapons to FARC in the 1990s and quite 
possibly beyond.62
Congo (RoC) 1999: Italy (83,000 pistols and revolvers), Poland (1.0m ammunition), South Africa (15,000 rifles)
2000: Austria (20,500 rifles), France (0.1m mainly shotgun cartridges and shotguns), Georgia (0.6m ammunition)
2001: France (0.1m shotguns), Italy (0.2m ammunition)
2002: Italy (0.4m ammunition)
Congo DRC 1998: China (19.0m mainly military weapons and ammunition)
2000: Czech Rep. (0.15m ammunition)
2001: Germany (30,000 pistols and revolvers)
China,63 Italy,64 Libya,65 Namibia,66 Zimbabwe 67
Congo DRC Rwanda,68 Uganda 69
(insurgents)
Ethiopia 1998: China (0.9m ammunition)
1999: Russia (6.5m mainly ammunition)
2000: Russia (83,000 parts and accessories for military weapons)
2001: South Korea (3.7m military weapons)
2002: China (0.3m mainly military weapons and parts and accessories for military weapons), Russia (5.15m parts and 
accessories for military weapons), Denmark (0.2m parts and accessories for military weapons), Netherlands (12,500 
parts and accessories for military weapons), South Korea (0.1m mainly hunting rifles)
Indonesia 1998: Brazil (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols), China (12,000 military weapons and parts 
and accessories for shotguns or rifles), Czech Republic (16,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), France (55,000 
ammunition), Germany (0.7m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), India (43,000 mainly shotgun 
cartridges), Italy (29,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), Netherlands (0.3m parts and accessories for revolvers and 
pistols, and parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), Singapore (15,000 mainly parts and accessories for 
shotguns or hunting rifles), South Korea (1.7m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Spain (14,000 pistols
and revolvers), Sweden (0.2m mainly shotgun cartridges), Thailand (71,000 parts and accessories for revolvers or 
pistols), Turkey (0.4m mainly military weapons), UK (0.5m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), 
US (70,000 mainly ammunition)
1999: Belgium (13,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), Brazil (0.2m mainly hunting rifles), China (0.2m 
mainly parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), Czech Republic (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for military 
weapons), France (11,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), Germany (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for
military weapons), India (35,000 parts and accessories for military weapons, and ammunition), Italy (37,000 mainly 
pistols and revolvers), Japan (12,000 mainly military weapons), Malaysia (0.1m parts and accessories for revolvers or 
pistols), Netherlands (19,000 parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), Singapore (76,000 mainly shotgun 
barrels), South Korea (4.4m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Spain (91,000 mainly pistols and 
revolvers), Sweden (55,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), UK (1.35m mainly parts and accessories
for shotguns or hunting rifles), US (0.1m mainly ammunition)
2000: Austria (35,000 mainly hunting rifles), Brazil (79,000 mainly hunting rifles), China (0.5m mainly military 
weapons and shotgun barrels), Germany (80,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), Italy (38,000 mainly military 
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Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998—2002
Country Exporters, years, and USD values
weapons), Japan (0.1m pistols and revolvers), Pakistan (0.1m parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), Singapore
(0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Slovakia (9.0m mainly ammunition), South Korea (0.1m 
mainly shotgun cartridges), Sweden (93,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Turkey (75,000 
mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), UK (0.3m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), 
US (49,000 mainly shotguns),
2001: Austria (30,000 hunting rifles and parts and accessories for revolvers or pistols), Brazil (0.2m mainly hunting 
rifles), Hong Kong (14,000 ammunition), Czech Republic (0.1m mainly ammunition), France (21,000 parts and 
accessories for military weapons), Germany (0.1m mainly ammunition), Italy (15,000 mainly shotguns), Japan (30,000 
pistols and revolvers), Malaysia (13,000 military weapons), Singapore (0.3m mainly military weapons), Spain (50,000 
mainly pistols and revolvers), Sweden (0.2m parts and accessories for military weapons), Turkey (98,000 mainly parts 
and accessories for military weapons), UK (57,000 ammunition), US (29,000 mainly parts and accessories for shotguns 
or hunting rifles)
2002: Austria (0.2m mainly military weapons), Brazil (0.6m mainly rifles), China (0.2m mainly parts and accessories 
for military weapons), Czech Republic (34,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), Hungary (11,000 pistols and revolvers), 
Italy (45,000 mainly shotguns), Philippines (0.4m parts and accessories for military weapons), Russia (17,000 military
weapons), Singapore (4.4m mainly military weapons), South Africa (85,000 military weapons), South Korea (0.3m 
mainly ammunition), Sri Lanka (13,000 pistols and revolvers), Sweden (87,000 parts and accessories for military 
weapons), Switzerland (14,000 mainly pistols and revolvers, and parts and accessories for pistols or revolvers), 
Turkey (66,000 mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles)
Indonesia Ethnic Achenese living in Malaysia,70 illicit supplies originating in Thailand 71
(insurgents)
Iraq No information available on SALW transfers
Liberia Illicit supplies originating in Serbia 72
Liberia, (LURD) Illicit supplies originating in Guinea, Ivory Coast 73
Myanmar 1998: China (3.4m military weapons)
1999: China (0.1m parts and accessories)
2001: China (0.1m parts and accessories)
China,74 Israel,75 Pakistan,76 Russia,77 Vietnam 78
Myanmar Allegations of illicit supplies originating in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and China.79
(insurgents)
North Korea 1998: China (0.7m mainly ammunition and military weapons)
1999: China (1.9m mainly hunting rifles)
2000: China (81,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons)
2002: UK (13,000 hunting rifles)
Pakistan 1998: China (3.5m mainly ammunition), Czech Republic (64,000 mainly pistols and revolvers), Germany (51,000 mainly
pistols and revolvers, and shotguns), Italy (0.1m mainly shotguns), Turkey (0.4m ammunition), UK (18,000 mainly 
ammunition), US (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles),
1999: China (0.2m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), France (34,000 parts and accessories for military
weapons), Germany (16,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), Italy (92,000 mainly shotguns), South Africa (0.9m mainly 
ammunition), Switzerland (0.1m parts and accessories for military weapons), UK (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for
military weapons), US (60,000 mainly military weapons)
2000: Brazil (12,000 hunting rifles), China (0.5m mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Czech Republic
(40,000 mainly ammunition), Germany (84,000 mainly ammunition), Italy (22,000 mainly shotguns), South Korea
(5.4m ammunition), Switzerland (70,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), UK (57,000 mainly parts 
and accessories for military weapons and ammunition)
2001: China (0.3m mainly shotguns), Czech Republic (0.1m mainly ammunition), France (22,000 parts and accessories 
for shotguns or hunting rifles), Germany (29,000 mainly ammunition), Italy (54,000 mainly shotguns), Switzerland
(57,000 parts and accessories for military weapons)
2002: Brazil (1.9m shotgun cartridges), China (0.1m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), 
France (74,000 parts and accessories for military weapons), Italy (27,000 mainly shotguns), UK (17,000 mainly 
ammunition), US (12,000 ammunition)
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Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998—2002
Country Exporters, years, and USD values
Russia 1998: Austria (0.7m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Belarus (12,500 mainly shotgun cartridges), 
Belgium-Luxembourg (0.5m mainly shotguns), Cyprus (0.3m mainly shotguns), Czech Republic (40,000 mainly 
sporting and hunting rifles), Finland (0.1m mainly shotguns), France (2.4m mainly shotguns), Germany (1.0m mainly 
shotguns, sporting and hunting rifles, and ammunition), Italy (1.1m mainly shotguns), Kazakhstan (0.9m mainly parts 
and accessories for military weapons), Latvia (11,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), Portugal
(13,000 shotguns), South Korea (11,500 sporting and hunting rifles), Spain (0.9m mainly ammunition), Turkey (29,000 
mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), UK (0.3m mainly shotgun cartridges), Ukraine (0.1m mainly shotgun
cartridges), US (1.0m mainly sporting and hunting rifles)
1999: Austria (0.5m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Belgium (0.2m mainly shotguns), Cyprus (15,500 mainly 
shotguns), Czech Republic (85,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Finland (0.3m mainly shotguns), France (0.7m 
mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Georgia (16,000 mainly ammunition and military weapons), Germany (0.5m mainly
shotguns and sporting and hunting rifles), Italy (0.9m mainly shotguns), Nicaragua (0.1m shotgun cartridges), 
Switzerland (76,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Turkey (0.2m parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles), 
Ukraine (18,000 mainly parts and accessories for military weapons), United Arab Emirates (11,000 ammunition), 
US (57,000 mainly shotguns and parts and accessories for military weapons) 
2000: Australia (11,000 ammunition), Austria (0.7m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Belgium (0.3m mainly 
shotguns), Bulgaria (88,000 ammunition), Cyprus (11,000 mainly shotguns), Czech Republic (0.2m mainly sporting 
and hunting rifles), Finland (0.1m mainly shotguns), France (1.2m mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and shotguns), 
Georgia (1.4m mainly military weapons), Germany (1.5m mainly shotguns), Italy (1.2m mainly shotguns), Kazakhstan
(65,000 military weapons and parts and accessories for military weapons), Spain (46,000 mainly ammunition), Turkey
(0.15m parts and accessories of shotguns or rifles), UK (0.1m mainly shotguns), Ukraine (0.1m mainly parts and 
accessories for military weapons), US (57,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and ammunition)
2001: Austria (1.5m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Belgium (0.5m mainly shotguns), Czech Republic (0.3m 
mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Finland (0.3m mainly sporting and hunting rifles, and shotguns), France (1.2m 
mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Germany (2.8m mainly shotguns and sporting and hunting rifles), Italy (1.8m 
mainly shotguns), Japan (15,000 mainly shotguns), Portugal (64,000 shotguns), Spain (0.5m mainly parts and 
accessories for military weapons), Sweden (36,000 ammunition), Switzerland (51,000 mainly sporting and hunting 
rifles), Turkey (50,000 mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles), UK (0.2m mainly shotguns), Ukraine
(40,000 parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles), US (0.7m mainly ammunition)
2002: Austria (1.7m mainly sporting and hunting rifles), Belgium (0.7m mainly shotguns), Cyprus (11,000 shotgun 
cartridges), Czech Republic (0.4m mainly hunting and sporting rifles), Finland (0.3m mainly hunting and sporting 
rifles), France (1.1m mainly hunting and sporting rifles, and shotguns), Germany (0.4m mainly sporting and hunting 
rifles), Italy (2.9m mainly shotguns), Japan (85,000 shotguns), Portugal (0.1m mainly shotguns), South Korea (0.1m 
ammunition), Spain (0.3m mainly shotgun cartridges), Sweden (39,000 mainly ammunition), Switzerland (69,000 
sporting and hunting rifles), UK (45,000 mainly shotguns), Ukraine (0.7m parts and accessories for military weapons), 
US (82,000 mainly sporting and hunting rifles)
Russia (Chechen Illicit supplies originating with Russian military officials,80 Georgia,81 the Taliban,82 various militant Islamic  
insurgents) non-state actors,82 Turkey 84
Rwanda 1998: China (13,000 mainly shotguns)
2000: Russia (0.8m parts and accessories for military weapons)
2002: Turkey (37,500 ammunition), Saudi Arabia (11,000 military weapons)
US,85 although unclear whether US military aid includes SALW.
Sierra Leone 2000: UK (10,000 ammunition)
2001: Lebanon (0.2m military weapons), US (29,500 parts and accessories), Spain (13,000 ammunition)
Sierra Leone (RUF) Liberia,86 Burkina Faso,87  Niger,88 Ukraine 89
Sudan 1998: China (40,000 rifles)
1999: Cyprus (22,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), Iran (0.8m ammunition)
2000: Cyprus (17,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), Iran (2.5m parts and accessories for shotguns and hunting rifles, 
and ammunition)
2001: Austria (26,000 mainly shotguns), Cyprus (11,000 mainly shotgun cartridges), UK (10,000 pistols and revolvers), 
Ecuador (10,500 parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols)
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Brazil, Cambodia, 
Costa Rica, Finland,
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the Netherlands had
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Table 4.13 (cont.) Known exports of small arms (in USD) to states where gross violations of human rights occur, 1998—2002
Country Exporters, years, and USD values
2002: China (1.0m mainly parts and accessories for shotguns or hunting rifles), Egypt (14,000 mainly pistols and 
revolvers), Iran (5.4m mainly ammunition, military weapons, and shotgun cartridges), Saudi Arabia (65,000 mainly 
military weapons), Switzerland (4.3m military weapons), UK (0.2m parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols),
Russia,90 although unclear whether Russian weapons include SALW. 
A Human Rights Watch report (1998b) shows that supplies in the earlier part of the 1990s were extremely varied.
Sudan (insurgents) There is a significant amount of illicit trafficking in SALW between Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya.91
Yugoslavia Allegations for 1998-2002 period do not include small arms.
Yugoslavia  (KLA) Illicit supplies originating in Albania, Croatia, Germany, Iran, Switzerland,92 Bosnia and Herzegovina,93
Montenegro 94
Note:  Cut-off point for inclusion in table: USD 10,000 per annum.
Source: Whenever not otherwise stated, UN Comtrade. Download date: 23 January 2004
Box 4.5 Using international law to curb arms transfers to human rights abusers?
In the autumn of 2003, a coalition of NGOs (Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), and
Oxfam) launched a campaign to control the international trade in arms, and in particular the small arms trade, and called for
the adoption of the so-called Arms Trade Treaty (or the ÔFramework Convention on International Arms TransfersÕ).
The draft Arms Trade Treaty was first developed in 2000—01. It was a collaborative effort involving a number of international
NGOs, the Commission of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, and international lawyers. The treaty is informally supported by a num-
ber of states, and as of early December 2003 seven states had expressly pledged their support for a treaty of this kind: Brazil,
Cambodia, Costa Rica, Finland, Macedonia, Mali, and the Netherlands (Control Arms, 2003).
As currently envisaged, it covers all arms transfers, not only small arms. It is a short text (comprising ten articles all in all),
stipulating (a) that contracting states should not license exports of arms which would violate their express obligations under
international law (such as UN Security Council decisions, international treaties, and customary law); (b) that contracting states
should not license arms exports when the state Ôhas knowledge or ought reasonably to have knowledgeÕ that transfers of arms
of the kind under consideration are ÔlikelyÕ to be used in violation of the prohibitions on the threat or use of force, or to commit
serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law; (c) that that there should be a Ôpresumption against
authorizationÕ when the arms to be exported are likely to be used in committing violent crimes or would undermine political
stability, regional security, or economic development; and (d) that the states adhering to the Treaty should establish an inter-
national registry of international arms transfers to monitor compliance.95
In essence, the drafters and proponents of the Arms Trade Treaty have claimed that it assembles and consolidates into one
single document those limitations on statesÕ freedom to transfer weapons that can be derived from existing legally binding
international agreements and norms on human rights, international humanitarian law, and peace and security. Some critics of
the Arms Trade Treaty argue that, in fact, some of the provisions of the draft treaty go beyond current binding international
law. Others, in contrast, argue that it is ÔunambitiousÕ. The many promoters of the project have argued that the Treaty and its
format is a good way forward as it would be legally binding (rather than a political document such as the UN Programme of
Action), valid internationally (hence preventing the case in which an irresponsible sale rejected by one state is accepted by
another), and flexible (it is conceived as a framework convention, to which more specific legal provisions, such as on brokering
or transport agents, can be added).
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CONCLUSION
This chapter introduces a couple of novelties in examining the authorized global small arms trade. For the first time,
it gives information not only on the main exporting and importing countries but also on their most important trading
partners and principal categories of weapons traded. Thus, some problematic cases which have not yet attracted much
attention were revealed: known medium-sized producers without recorded authorized exports (Iran, Pakistan, and
Singapore) and whose export activities thus remain ‘black holes’; Czech exports of small arms to Yemen; Brazilian
and Russian exports to Algeria; massive imports by Cyprus and Saudi Arabia (not least from Western states); and sig-
nificant imports by Colombia, Israel, Lebanon, Venezuela, and others. Subsequent editions of the Small Arms Survey
will try to map illicit transfers in a similar way.
The analysis of main exporters and importers is based on international customs data and export reports. The com-
parison of the two sources shows that we are still far from a clear and coherent picture of the authorized global trade
in small arms. This is an important reason for introducing a second novelty: the Small Arms Trade Transparency
Barometer, which assesses state export transparency on a 20-point scale. The barometer is based on the information
made available by the main exporting states (that is, export reports and international customs data). The barometer
will be a recurrent feature of the Small Arms Survey. In subsequent editions, it will thus be possible to assess whether
individual states, as well as the international community as a whole, are becoming more or less transparent over time.
This chapter has shown that, with an average of 8.5 out of 20, such developments would be more than welcome.
Another issue that will have to be dealt with is the transparency of importing states.
It is with a view to better understanding the authorized trade that this chapter also sets out to examine the rela-
tionship between production and trade for the first time. We have shown that, for some of the world’s largest pro-
ducers of small arms, export is key to survival. Until recently, virtually all of Russia’s military small arms production
depended on international orders. Its civilian production is less export-dependent, although a considerable share is
sold abroad. The same is true for Brazil, more than 60 per cent of whose production is exported. Germany, one of
Europe’s largest producers, follows the same pattern. The exception to what seems, albeit at a first glace, to be a uni-
formly export-dependent industry is the US, less than 10 per cent of whose production (but a higher share of military
weapons) is exported. Future editions of the Survey will deal with the other main source of small arms transfers,
namely pre-existing state stockpiles.
Lastly, in line with the theme of the 2004 edition of the Small Arms Survey, the chapter examines the links
between human rights violations and small arms transfers. When examining transfers to countries with serious human
rights problems, it becomes clear that many governments still have some way to go to achieve full consistency
between their various foreign policy objectives: a relatively large number of states where human rights violations are
widespread have no shortage of suppliers.
4. LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendices 4.1–4.4 are available on the Small Arms Survey Web site at 
www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2004.htm.
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4. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ATF US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BRL Brazilian real
CAD Canadian dollar
CHF Swiss franc
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
EUR Euro
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia
HRW Human Rights Watch
HS Harmonized system
IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MANPADS Man-portable air defence system
NOK Norwegian kroner
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCASED Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
RoC Republic of Congo
SALW Small arms and light weapons
SEK Swedish krona
SITC Standard International Trade Classification
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USD United States dollar
WMEAT World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
ZAR South African rand
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1 In this chapter, ‘small arms’, ‘guns’, ‘firearms’, and ‘small arms and
light weapons’ are used interchangeably unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
2 In this chapter, ‘trade’ and ‘transfers’ are used interchangeably, unless
otherwise stated.
3 More technically, production and pre-existing stockpiles of small
arms are called primary and secondary levels of supply. There is
also a tertiary level of supply, which indicates arms supplies from
groups within the wider population (insurgents, ex-combatants,
criminals, and so on) (Naylor, 1998, p. 232).
4 In Box 4.1, Sergio Finardi and Carlo Tombola come to a slightly larger
figure, USD 2.8 billion, also based on customs data, because they
include slightly different categories in their definition of small arms.
5 The international customs database employed here is UN Comtrade.
For a more detailed discussion of this source, see Small Arms
Survey (2001, ch. 4; 2003, Box 3.1).
6 A major problem with estimating exports is that they fluctuate from
year to year. For smaller exporters in particular, exports are
dependent sometimes on a single transaction, and can hence go
up or down several hundred per cent from one year to the next.
Estimates are therefore restricted to major producers only, for
whom such fluctuations should be relatively smaller.
7 <www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2004.htm>
8 Brazil may also record its firearm exports in a somewhat unorthodox
way, filing its pistols and revolvers exports under the customs cat-
egory ‘other sporting, hunting or target shooting rifles’. If this is
correct, as some preliminary research by Dreyfus and Lessing (2003)
seems to suggest, the above figures overestimate the actual trade.
9 The research projects (Adriane’s Thread: The Transport Networks
of Arms Trade; and The Matchmakers: How Legal and Illegal
Business Meet at Ports and Airports) were funded by the Program
of Global Security and Sustainability of the John D. and Catherine
T. MacArthur Foundation in 1999 and 2001.
10 We reviewed all SALW-related 51,358 exporter and 56,442 importer dec-
larations included in SITC Rev. 3 code 891 (SITC [Standard International
Trade Classification] is a different coding system from the HS codes used
elsewhere in this chapter). The cross-analysis of exporter and importer
declarations was necessary for (a) amending gaps and inconsistencies in
reporting and (b) trying to amend inconsistencies in coding, because ‘the
rules for the same products can be applied differently between countries...
the registrations of imports and exports are done independently... and
the commodity classification systems are likely to be different’
(Ronald Jansen, Chief of the UN Statistics Division’s Commodity Trade
Statistics Section, personal communication, 9 October 2003). At the end
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of this process, the database included about 82,545 entries relevant to
SALW trade, selected according to the following criteria: (a) if available,
matching exporter and importer declarations were compared and the
higher value was chosen; (b) exporter’s declarations were supplement-
ed by the importer’s when the former did not declare exports that were
recorded by the latter. In theory, at world level, imports and exports
should be of identical value, net of f.o.b. (free on board, excluding
insurance and freight) and c.i.f. (cost including insurance and freight).
11 SITC codes 891.14 (Revolvers and pistols); 891.22 (Cartridges for shot-
guns); 891.23 (Air gun pellets and parts of cartridges for shotguns); 891.24
(Cartridges and parts thereof, n.e.s.); 891.31 (Non-military firearms);
891.91 (Parts and accessories of revolvers or pistols); 891.93 (Sports
shotgun barrels.); 891.95 (Parts of sports shotguns and rifles); 891.99
(Parts and accessories of military weapons other than revolvers and
pistols, and nonmilitary arms other than firearms and side arms).
12 SITC 891.12 (Military weapons, other than revolvers and pistols);
891.29 (Munitions of war and parts thereof, n.e.s.).
13 SITC 891.39 (Non military arms other than firearms such as air guns,
rifles and pistols, and truncheons); 891.13 (Swords, cutlasses, bayo-
nets, lances and parts thereof).
14 According to factors provided by the US Department of Defense.
15 For example, the M-47 (Dragon), the 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn),
or the surface-to-air FIM-92 Stinger.
16 Harmonized System 2002 (HS2002), codes 930111 and 930119;
930120; and 930190.
17 For the UN definition, see PRODUCERS.
18 Kalashnikov’s AK-47s, AKM, AKS-74 are all outfitted with detachable
bayonet-knives, as are Heckler-Koch’s HK G36s and many other
assault rifles. Widely traded bayonets and knives are, for example,
Smith & Wesson SWAT, US combat M3 to M10, Beretta Model 92
knife, and Spanish FR7 bayonet, as well as the famous Gurkha Kukris
and machetes, standard weapons for the Royal Gurkha Rifles.
19 An energy in excess of 6ft/lbs for pistols and 12ft/lbs for rifles at the
muzzle is considered very dangerous and, for example, the popular
Webley & Scott Patriot and the Beeman Crow Magnum rifles pro-
duce 26–30ft/lbs at the muzzle, not to mention that some air weapons
may be easily converted to use conventional ammunition.
20 See, for example, the Prowler XS-B3, by China Xifeng, official
training rifle for Chinese military youth.
21 Such as Webley & Scott, Beretta, Walther, Smith & Wesson, and
Colt. A list is available at <http://www.pyramydair.com>
22 Exceptions include Belgium and Italy.
23 For background information on the process, see Lodgaard and
Rønnfeldt (1998).
24 According to Courtney (2002, p. 8), ‘[d]espite accounting for less than
1% of total world trade... and less than 10% of the five most corrupt-
ible trades, sources from the US Department of Commerce indicate
that [the overall arms trade] accounts for around 50% of all corrupt
transactions’. The arms trade generally is the second most corruptible
trade, after public works/construction, in terms of both frequency
and value of bribes paid (Transparency International, 2002).
25 It is important to note that transparency is only a first step to
accountability. In future editions of the Small Arms Survey, account-
ability in the SALW trade will be addressed further. For more detailed
arguments in favour of transparency, see Haug et al. (2002).
26 The first information exchange in 2001 did not include transfers.
27 This is the case when a country identifies both the recipient country
and the type(s) of weapons exported to that particular country. This
is different from reporting separately on trading partners and types
of weapons exported. A country can report on both, but they do
not necessarily have to be linked, in the sense that it is possible to
tell which types of weapons are exported to which countries. 
Not included here are total numbers of deliveries and licences granted
and denied, which refer to the global number for all arms exports
(that is, including SALW as well as larger weapons and weapon sys-
tems, and summing up deliveries to all foreign countries). Also not
included are deliveries disaggregated by country (that is, a list of fig-
ures for all arms transactions with one particular recipient state; for
example, Sweden reports that its arms exports (all categories of arms)
to Singapore in 2002 totalled SEK 419.8 million (USD 43.4 million)
(Sweden 2003)). Neither tells us anything about small arms exports.
28 The only exceptions are availability (a) on Internet (b) free of charge
(worth half a point each) and information on licence denials,
which has been weighted as being less important than information
on licences granted and actual deliveries.
29 For a thorough discussion on which the following is based, see
Marsh (2003) and Lessing (2003).
30 For a critique of the UK export report, see Saferworld (2003). A
similar critique of the German report is published yearly by the
Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung (GKKE).
31 This table is based on the analysis made in Kytömäki and Firchow
(2004). Its format is adapted from Haug et al. (2002, pp. 30–1)
32 These are: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
33 This subsection is based on Haug (2003).
34 All data in this paragraph is based on ATF reports, as they are the
only source of data to list both production and exports of small arms.
35 This subsection is based on CAST (2003) unless otherwise stated.
36 The information on Brazil is based on Dreyfus and Lessing (2003).
37 The actual amount listed is BRL 233,264,096, and includes pistols,
revolvers, shotguns, carbines, and all other non-military firearms;
ammunition and cartridges for such weapons; and parts, acces-
sories, and services related to these items. In addition, the survey
lists USD 38.5 million (BRL 89,624,377) under another heading,
‘heavy military equipment’, which includes military arms (armas
de guerra), bombs, grenades, and other projectiles; armoured
combat vehicles; and parts, accessories, and services related to
these items. Some of these items, particularly assault rifles, grenades,
and mortar ammunition, may be small arms.
38 SECEX database (Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry, and
Foreign Trade; Secretariat for Foreign Trade). This figure includes
all customs subheadings of Chapter 93 except for those under the
headings 9301 (military arms), 9303.90 (starting pistols, flare guns,
and captive-bolt guns), 9304 (compressed air and spring-powered
guns), 9305.91 (parts and accessories of military arms), 9306.90
(guided missiles, bombs, grenades, and munitions of war) and
9307 (swords, cutlasses, bayonets, etc.).
39 Company information filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission of Brazil (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, CVM). All infor-
mation is taken from Annual Reports (Informações Anuais, IAN) and
Standard Financial Reports (Demonstrações Financeiras Padronizadas,
DFP). See <http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.asp>
40 Data from SECEX database.
41 For more details on Argentina and other Latin American countries,
see Dreyfus and Lessing (forthcoming).
42 In 2002, Brazil reported USD 117.6 million in arms exports to
Malaysia, of which USD 67.5 million fell into non-military export
headings. However, the anomalous size of these totals, along with
corroborating press reports of a sale of an advanced missile system
to the Malaysian government, suggest that most of these exports
were not SALW. Consequently, we have not included them here.
43 For an allusion to this European view of the US as ‘a society
plagued by guns and violence’, see Blinken (2001).
44 This section covers mainly human rights, rather than international
humanitarian law.
45 Belgium did so in the aftermath to the ‘Arms to Nepal’ row, over which
a government minister resigned in August 2002 (BICC, 2003, Box U.18).
46 Here, internal repression is taken to include, inter alia, ‘torture and other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or
arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other
major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out
in relevant international human rights instruments, including the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights’ (EU Code of Conduct, criterion two).
47 The Latin American NGO Viva Rio has been doing the same kind
of research, but is most well known for tracing guns used in crime.
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